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This dissertation consists of three distinct essays, although the first two are closely
related. In the first two chapters, I present evidence that low-skilled newly arrived
immigrants help keep the economy in geographic equilibrium by differentially se-
lecting destinations that provide better labor market prospects. Many models of
local economies predict that the presence of a mobile factor will reduce wage and
unemployment disparities across geography. Immigrants, as a self-selected group of
highly mobile workers, are a natural though understudied candidate to serve in this
capacity. Given the large disparity in mobility by skill among natives (low-skilled
workers are especially immobile), immigrants’ ability to respond to such differences
is especially important.
In the first essay, I demonstrate that immigrants select labor markets with smaller
welfare-reform created native supply shocks. Reforms to the welfare system in the
1990s dramatically increased the labor market participation of native low-skilled
women. Welfare leavers and newly arriving low-skilled immigrants work in much the
same occupations, and thus are competing for the same set of job vacancies. Simple
labor market theories predict that increases in native supply will either reduce the
probability that searching workers find employment, decrease their wages once they
1
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are hired, or some combination of the two. Immigrants who are willing to alter their
chosen destination for an improvement in expected earnings have a clear incentive
to choose labor markets experiencing smaller policy-driven supply shocks. Using
a linearized version of a discrete choice model, I demonstrate that immigrants do
exactly this. Even after netting out differences due to the changing set of immigrants’
origins, the distribution of destination cities within the US shifts markedly away from
cities with high welfare participation prior to reform and toward cities with lower
participation. In fact, changes in immigrants’ chosen destinations “undo” nearly all
of the difference in labor supply that would have resulted had they continued to go
to more traditional locations.
The second essay demonstrates that changes in states’ minimum wage policies
also affect the destinations immigrants choose. Unlike the first chapter, in which
the policy change creates a clear incentive for immigrants to select one location over
another, an increase in the minimum wage has a theoretically ambiguous effect on
a job seeker’s expected earnings. The wage a worker will earn if he/she is hired
increases, but the probability of securing a position falls. I apply a classic two-sector
labor market model to a geographic context, and demonstrate how the labor demand
elasticity and turnover rate combine to determine whether expected earnings rise or
fall. I then use native teenagers, a highly immobile group, to determine that the
labor demand is sufficiently elastic that immigrants should prefer states that do not
increase their minimum wage. I then show that newly arriving immigrants do exactly
this. I find that immigrants choose not to go to states with large increases in the
minimum wages, instead selecting states with smaller increases or a fixed minimum.
The results are strong and statistically significant even after accounting for unob-
served fixed state characteristics, changes in the size of the immigrant population
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over time and differential growth rates of the immigrant population across states.
In sum, the first chapters provide evidence that newly arrived immigrants act as
labor market arbitrageurs, moving to destinations that provide better labor market
prospects and preventing negative labor market shocks from remaining concentrated
in a few geographic areas.
The final essay, which is co-authored with Ben Keys, investigates another form
of arbitrage. We propose an explanation for a surprising borrowing phenomenon:
nearly one fifth of undergraduate students who are offered interest-free loans turn
them down. In doing so, they are foregoing a significant government subsidy worth up
to $1,500. We suggest that the recent advances in behavioral economics can explain
students’ failure to accept this “free money.” We discuss a burgeoning literature
under which economic actors may actually prefer to limit their future choices rather
than expand them. As evidence that students are acting to limit their own liquidity,
we demonstrate a differential rejection rate based on the level of direct access that
students would have to the money. Some students who live off-campus will receive
refund checks if they accept the loan, exposing them to the temptation of easy-to-
spend cash. Students with the exact same family income and aid package, but who
live on-campus, will have their aid funds applied directly to their housing expenses,
partially mitigating the temptation of additional liquidity. Using a difference-in-
differences strategy, we find that students who would receive a refund check are six to
seven percentage points more likely to reject the loan than are similar students living
off-campus. We interpret this finding as evidence for the behavioral explanation.
CHAPTER II
How Do Immigration Flows Respond to Labor Market
Competition from Similarly-Skilled Natives?
2.1 Introduction
In the policy debate over immigration reform, no issue is as controversial as the
extent to which recent waves of immigration have affected the labor market op-
portunities of native workers. Economic theory clearly predicts that an exogenous
increase in low-skilled labor in a closed labor market will reduce the wages paid to
these workers. Yet many empirical studies have found very little effect of increased
immigration on natives’ labor market outcomes. Some authors have argued that this
disparity could arise if immigrants endogenously choose labor markets with better
earnings and employment prospects. In this paper, I present direct evidence of this
type of selection by demonstrating that immigrants arriving during the 1990s avoided
cities experiencing larger increases in native labor market participation as a result
of reforms to welfare policy. The results reveal a substantial degree of selection: for
each native woman who begins to work as a result of welfare reform, 0.83 immigrant
women choose to live and work in alternative locations.
This finding has important implications for interpreting the two strands of an
expansive literature that has examined the effect of immigration on natives’ labor
market outcomes. The first branch of the literature compares changes in wages and
4
5
employment for native workers in cities receiving large immigrant inflows to those
in cities receiving smaller inflows. Card’s (1990) influential paper studied the effect
of the Mariel Boatlift on Miami’s labor market. He found that despite the large
influx of predominantly low-skilled immigrants, subsequent wage and employment
growth among natives followed much the same pattern as in comparison cities that
received few Marieletos. Several subsequent papers find similar results - native wage
and employment growth is not significantly different across locations experiencing
substantially different inflows of immigrants.1
Critics of this “area analyses” approach have outlined two alternatives to explain
this lack of a spatial correlation. The theoretical prediction of lower native wages
requires both a closed labor market and exogenous immigration. The first criticism
questions whether local labor markets defined at the state or city level are actually
closed. The alternative hypothesis has been referred to as the “skating rink model”
(Card and DiNardo 2000). According to this view, each new immigrant locating in
a city bumps a native or pre-existing immigrant off the ice, i.e. causes them to move
to an alternative location. The resulting internal migration spreads the increase in
low-skilled labor throughout the nation, limiting the power of area studies analyses
to detect the effects of increased immigration.
The second critique focuses on the requirement that immigration to a city be
effectively random. The primary concern is that immigrants may disproportionately
choose areas where demand for low-skilled labor is increasing. If this selection occurs,
comparing natives’ wage growth in cities with differently-sized immigrant inflows
may understate the negative effects of immigration relative to those that would be
obtained in a closed market.
1Additional examples include Altonji and Card (1991), Lalonde and Topel (1991) and Schoeni (1997). A careful
review of these studies finds that, although the estimates vary from study to study, they are clustered around zero
(Smith and Edmonston 1997).
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The “factor shares” approach responded to these potential shortcomings by ex-
plicitly treating the market for labor as integrated at the national level. The first
study of this type combined data on immigration flows with externally-estimated
demand elasticities across skill groups to simulate the effect of increased low-skilled
immigration on native wages and employment (Borjas, Freeman and Katz 1997).
These simulations suggest that immigrants have significantly lowered wages for low-
skilled natives. The results are perhaps not surprising: in a model with only two
factors, an increase in the supply of one factor must necessarily reduce the wages
paid to that factor, and this approach essentially fits this model using census data.
More recent studies have addressed this shortcoming by considering a national
market for labor that has multiple factor groups based on education and experience
(Borjas 2003, Borjas, Grogger and Hanson 2006). Younger, less-educated workers’
wages have grown significantly less rapidly over the past four decades than have those
of their older and more-educated counterparts. These skill groups have also received
larger immigrant inflows over the same time period, and the authors of these studies
attribute the differential wage growth to differences in competition from immigrants.
In contrast to the area analyses approach the factor shares approach yields much
more negative effects of immigration on natives’ labor market outcomes.
Given that the two approaches yield such contradictory results, recent studies
have directly examined the original criticisms of the areas analyses method. Several
studies examine whether internal migration patterns effectively “undo” increases in
the low-skill population due to the arrival of new immigrants (e.g. Card and DiNardo
2000, Card 2001). Most find that internal migration does very little to offset changes
in the skill distribution due to immigration. A recent paper demonstrates both
that internal migration failed to mitigate changes to the skill mix of local economies
7
and that nevertheless differential immigrant inflows did not lead to differential wage
changes across locations (Card and Lewis 2005).
Designing a study to evaluate the “skating rink” alternative is relatively straight-
forward. One simply has to determine whether cities receiving more immigrants
actually become less skilled than cities with few new immigrants. Determining
whether immigrants select locations that offer better labor market prospects has
proved significantly more difficult for a number of reasons. First, immigrants may
select areas with higher wages and wage growth even if geographic differences in
these attributes do not directly affect immigrants’ location decisions. For example,
wages and growth may be correlated with other local amenities important to immi-
grants, including the location of previous immigrants, the local blend of taxes and
public goods or different costs of living. More importantly, testing the extent to
which immigrants select promising labor markets requires overcoming a simultane-
ity problem. Even if immigrants do choose areas with tight labor markets, their
decision to enter the market will reduce this tightness, making any selection mecha-
nism difficult to establish empirically. Existing studies do not attempt to overcome
this simultaneity issue and have found mixed results. Some give evidence consistent
with highly mobile responsive immigration flows while others find that ethnic net-
works and other city characteristics dwarf any impact of labor market opportunities
(Bartel 1989, Borjas 2001, Jaeger 2007).
How can these challenges to identification be overcome? The ideal research de-
sign would randomly assign increases in the demand for low-skilled labor across the
country, and examine the resulting changes in where immigrants choose to locate.
Lacking this experiment, one requires a source of plausibly exogenous geographic
variation in the labor market opportunities available to new immigrants. This paper
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argues that the increase in the number of low-skilled native women in the labor force
due to the 1996 federal welfare reform provides this type of policy-driven variation.
This policy change provides an ideal environment to determine whether immi-
grants select cities with better labor market prospects. Suppose that immigrants
and natives are substitutes in production, but that any consequences of this com-
petition are diffused throughout the country because immigrants choose locations
that offer better returns to their labor. Under this hypothesis, the native supply
increases created by welfare reform had a similar effect, from a potential immigrant’s
perspective, as a decrease in demand for her type of labor. Moreover, the effect
of welfare reform on the labor supply of natives was not equally distributed across
cities. Instead, the increase in native female employment within a local labor market
was primarily a function of the size of the population affected by the policy changes.
With different benefit levels across states and important demographic differences
across cities and states, the size of welfare caseloads varied dramatically prior to
reform.
This paper contributes to the literature, therefore, by identifying exogenous policy-
driven variation in the labor market prospects faced by newly-arriving low-skilled
immigrants and evaluating the effect of these differences on immigrants’ resulting lo-
cation choices. I use decennial census data from the 1980, 1990 and 2000 five percent
samples of the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) to create a sample
of immigrants who arrived during welfare reform, as well as in the decades prior to
reform. I estimate regressions motivated by a discrete choice random utility model,
allowing for unobserved city attributes that potentially differ among immigrants ac-
cording to sending country. I find that low-skilled immigrants arriving in the US
during the 1990s were significantly less likely to locate in the labor markets most
9
affected by welfare reform compared to immigrants arriving in the decade prior.
I also present several additional pieces of evidence that support interpreting this
relationship as evidence of immigrants responding to labor market competition. I
include a number of additional control variables, including measures of potentially
offsetting changes in demand and variables that allow for general dispersion of immi-
grants across the country. Each of these variables enters the model in the expected
direction, yet the negative estimate of the effect of the reform-induced supply shocks
remains strong and significant. Additionally, I repeat the analysis using waves of
the census immediately prior to welfare reform. In a period with no major changes
to the welfare system (the 1980s), welfare caseloads are unrelated both to changes
in native employment and to changes in immigrants’ location decisions. Finally, I
demonstrate that the negative relationship is strongest among immigrants who made
their most recent move after the implementation of welfare reform.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section describes the
policy changes and presents evidence of welfare reform’s disparate geographic effect
on native labor supply; Section 2.3 presents a discrete choice model and motivates
the appropriate empirical methodology for estimation; Section 2.4 discusses the data
sources, and provides a descriptive analysis of new immigrants and the extent to
which they compete for jobs with welfare leavers; Section 2.5 presents the main
empirical results and additional robustness checks; the final section discusses the
implications of these findings both for interpreting the previous literature and for
policymakers.
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2.2 Welfare Reform and Labor Supply
In this section, I discuss the changes to welfare policy over the 1990s and how each
was designed to increase the employment of former recipients. I then present two
facts that are essential to the later formal empirical analysis. First, I provide evidence
that these reforms substantially increased the labor supply of the target population. I
further demonstrate that geographical differences in welfare participation rates prior
to reform reliably predict differential increases in native female employment over the
reform period. Taken together, these results suggest that pre-reform participation
rates can serve as an instrument for changes in native female labor supply from
1990 to 2000. These exogenous supply shocks allow for direct evaluation of whether
immigrants choose labor markets with better returns to employment.
The federal cash welfare system, first implemented in 1935, was originally de-
signed to provide for the material needs of widows with dependent children. The
program was designed so that women could stay at home to care for their children.
By the late 1970s, the demographic makeup of the welfare rolls had changed dra-
matically. Widows were covered by social security and rising rates of divorce and
nonmarital childbearing meant that most recipients were in families headed by di-
vorced and never-married mothers. As greater numbers of married women worked,
there was political pressure to increase employment among mothers on welfare. In
the early 1990s, states were given expanded authority to secure federal waivers from
AFDC program rules and in 1996 the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) ended the AFDC program.
After reform, cash assistance was no longer a federal entitlement program; seeking
or participating in employment became a pre-condition for benefit receipt. Welfare
11
offices implemented work support and “work first” programs to move women into
the workforce. The culture of local welfare offices changed - caseworkers were now
expected to provide supportive employment services rather than simply determining
eligibility for benefits. Welfare recipients are now subject to a sixty month lifetime
limit (fewer at state discretion), giving potential recipients an incentive to delay ben-
efit receipt and search more intensely for employment opportunities before applying.
2 Most states also reduced the rate at which benefits are taxed away as a recipient
earns income, thus reducing disincentives to work. Concurrent expansions in the
federal Earned Income Tax Credit gave single mothers additional financial incen-
tives to work. Each of these policies was designed to increase employment and raise
the return to work among women who, in the absence of reform, might have relied
mainly on public assistance (Ellwood 2000). The cumulative effect of these reforms
created the textbook definition of a labor supply shift - policy changes resulted in
more low-skilled women willing to work at any given wage.
The empirical literature evaluating welfare reform supports the conclusion that
these reforms increased employment among the target population. While any credible
study of the effect of these changes includes essential controls for the role of the strong
macroeconomy over the period in which reform was implemented, most studies (and
especially evaluations of demonstration projects using random assignment) find that
the policy changes had a significant effect on the labor force attachment of low-
skilled women.3 Figure 2.1 uses data from the annual March Supplement to the
Current Population Survey (CPS) and shows trends in the employment rate for
women with at most a high school degree between the ages of eighteen and fifty-four
living in large Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). They are classified according
2Grogger, Haider and Klerman (2003) find that as much as half of the decline in caseloads resulted from a decrease
in the entry rate.
3For a careful review of the employment effects of welfare reform, see Blank (2002, pp.1139-1142).
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to marital status and parenthood.4 Employment among single mothers increased
dramatically from 61 percent in 1993 to 79 percent in 2000. There was no similar
increase among women in either of two comparison groups - married mothers or
single women without children. In 1993, single mothers had an employment rate
that was 11 percentage points lower than that of single women without children; by
2005, their employment rate was 6 points higher.
Even though many of the policy changes were implemented at the national level,
pre-existing characteristics of MSAs led to significant geographic variation in the
extent to which this reform affected employment. Local labor markets whose welfare
recipients represented a greater fraction of potential participants experienced larger
increases in employment. As evidence of this relationship, consider Figure 2.2, con-
structed with the same annual CPS data as Figure 2.1. To create this figure, I rank
each MSA based on the fraction of all low-skilled women receiving cash welfare from
1988 to 1992. I then select women from all years who live in MSAs that fall into the
top or bottom quartile of this ranking.5 Although the levels are different, the time
pattern of employment in both quartiles is quite similar prior to the mid-1990s. After
that point, however, employment increases significantly for women in high partici-
pation cities. Employment among women in low participation cities, in contrast, is
roughly flat. By the end of the decade the employment gap (on average eight to nine
percentage points prior to reform) had essentially disappeared. Thus, the degree of
welfare participation prior to reform reliably predicts increases in employment over
the reform period.
Having established that welfare reform had differential effects on the employment
4As closely as possible, this set of cities matches the consistent geographic areas described in Section 2.4.
5 This figure takes the average over all women living in any city within a quartile. Each quartile contains 33
MSAs, and captures a roughly equal fraction of the sample population. A similar, though somewhat noisier pattern
emerges when each MSA average contributes one observation to the quartile mean. The cutoffs for the bottom and
top quintiles are around 5 and 10 percentage points, respectively.
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rate of women by geographic area, it is worth examining whether these increases
represent substantial labor market competition for newly-arriving low-skilled immi-
grants. Several descriptive factors suggest that this is the case. First, the population
affected by welfare reform and the flow of new immigrants are of similar magnitudes.
Welfare rolls fell by 2.3 million adults (from 3.8 to 1.5 million) between 1990 and
2000 (US Department of Health and Human Services 2007).6 Over that same time
period 4.4 million low-skilled immigrants (male and female) entered the country (US
Bureau of the Census 2007).
In addition, newly arriving immigrants and welfare leavers tend to work in similar
jobs. Welch’s (1999) index of congruence provides a useful measure of the degree of
overlap in occupations and industries for various groups. This methodology has
been used in the immigration literature to determine which groups of natives and
immigrants should be considered close substitutes (e.g. Borjas 2003). The index is









with pkj and plj representing the fraction of the two groups working in occupation j
and p̄j representing the fraction of all workers in that occupation. This index has a
range from negative one to positive one. A value of positive one indicates complete
occupational overlap. Whenever one group is overrepresented in an occupation the
other group is similarly disproportionately likely to work in that same occupation.
A value of negative one implies the opposite relationship. Values near zero mean
that the two groups overlap about as much as each group overlaps with the average
6Note that these figures may understate the number of women affected by reform as the caseload reached a peak
of 4.4 million adults in 1994.
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worker.
Table 2.1 presents this index comparing single native women who are currently
working but received welfare in the past year to eight other groups of workers based on
gender, education and nativity. The data source and geographical selection criteria
are the same used in the first two figures, although I only use years in which nativity
questions were asked (post-1993). I classify both occupations and industries at the
two-digit level.
These results suggest that women entering the labor force in response to welfare
reform are very close substitutes for newly arriving female immigrants. The index for
occupation is +0.73, while the index for industry is +0.54. This is the highest degree
of overlap among all groups in occupation and second only to other low-skilled native
women in industry (+0.76). Although these results reveal significant occupational
sorting by gender, low-skilled immigrant men compete with welfare leavers about
as much as the average worker (industry and occupation values of -0.03 and -0.11
respectively). Overall, increases in labor supply among welfare leavers represent
significant competition to newly arriving immigrants (and vice versa).
In addition to the supply shock due to welfare reform, federal programs that
encouraged employers to hire welfare leavers potentially increased demand for welfare
recipients relative to those of other low-skilled workers, such as less-skilled native
men and immigrants. The Welfare to Work Partnership, formed by the Clinton
administration, recruited businesses to pledge to hire welfare leavers in entry level
jobs. Charter members included United Airlines, Burger King, and United Parcel
Service, companies in industries common for low-skilled immigrants. The Welfare to
Work Tax Credit refunded a portion of the earnings employers paid to recent welfare
leavers, with maximum credits over $8000 for hiring a “long-term” welfare recipient.
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Hiring a newly arrived immigrant would provide neither the public relations boost
nor the wage subsidy that came with hiring a recent welfare recipient.
If immigrants avoid labor markets with larger numbers of new native job seekers,
this fact could explain outstanding questions in the literature. For example, Card and
Lewis (2005) document the diffusion of newly arriving Mexican immigrants over the
1990s. In contrast to prior cohorts, these immigrants tended not to cluster as tightly
in traditional locations (i.e. California and Texas) and instead located in several
cities that had previously seen very few Mexican immigrants. The cities that they
identify as having the largest “surprising” inflows of Mexicans tend to be cities where
there were smaller relative numbers of welfare recipients.7 Additionally, there is little
evidence that welfare leavers had any detrimental effect on the employment and
wages of other potential labor market substitutes, such as low-skilled men (see, for
example, Blank and Gelbach 2006). These somewhat surprising results are consistent
with immigrants intentionally locating in areas with fewer women leaving the welfare
rolls for employment.
One final concern with the plausibility of the labor market competition explana-
tion is the degree to which newly arriving immigrants are informed about the labor
market opportunities awaiting them in the US. McLaren (2006) demonstrates that
border apprehensions are a reliable leading indicator of US economic growth, im-
plying that undocumented immigrants have access to information about the labor
market and do not undertake the risky venture of crossing the border unless they are
reasonably confident that they will find work. Selection across geography requires
only a minor extension to this model where potential immigrants have network con-
tacts in different cities, each providing this type of information.
7The cities mentioned in the text as surprising are Houston, Dallas, Atlanta, Phoenix, Las Vegas, New York,
Denver, Portland, Salt Lake City, Washington, DC, Seattle, Raleigh-Durham, Greensboro and Charlotte. Only New
York, Seattle and Raleigh-Durham had pre-reform participation rates above the median.
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Taken together, this descriptive evidence suggests that welfare leavers represent a
substantial exogenous increase in labor market competition for newly arriving low-
skilled immigrants. Further, geographic variation in pre-reform welfare participation
induces substantial differences in the degree to which local labor markets were af-
fected. These facts lead to a clear hypothesis: if immigrants are sufficiently sensitive
to geographic variation in the relative demand for their labor, newly arriving immi-
grants will tend to select locations with fewer women entering the labor market as
a result of welfare reform. The next section provides a theoretical model of location
choice, and suggests empirical specifications that can be used to test this hypothesis.
2.3 Empirical Model
This section provides a theoretical framework for understanding how differential
labor supply shifts across the country affect newly arriving immigrants’ location
choices. Suppose that each metropolitan area in the United States offers an immi-
grant a level of utility from settling there, Uisdt In this notation, i indexes individuals,
s indexes the source region, d denotes destination MSAs and t indexes time periods
(census decades).8 This setup is a standard discrete choice problem, and utility
maximization simply requires that an immigrant select the location that provides
the highest level of utility. The decision rule can be expressed in a straightforward
way: an immigrant chooses to move to location j if and only if Uisjt > Uisdt ∀d 6= j.
In the context of this model, the hypothesis that immigrants select locations that
offer better labor market prospects means that natives’ labor market attachment
will be an important component of the utility an immigrant receives from each city.
Locations with fewer natives willing to work at any given wage will offer better
8Because the data I use do not provide information on potential immigrants who choose not to migrate, I model
only the decision of where to locate conditional on deciding to move to the US. This simplification implicitly assumes
that the relative utility of cities within the US is independent of the value of remaining at home.
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employment and wage prospects, and thus immigrants will be more likely to select
these cities. The alternative hypothesis contends that the value of other factors,
such as the location of networks, is so large that differences in employment prospects
are unlikely to determine which location an immigrant ranks the highest. From
the researcher’s perspective, however, it is not possible to measure the utility of
each location for each individual, so one cannot directly investigate the effect native
supply shocks on utility. Instead, we can observe some attributes of each potential
choice as well as the location each immigrant selected. We can model the utility
levels as a common function of these observed attributes and an individual-specific
unobserved component. Suppose that the observable portion of the utility function
can be represented as a linear combination of the location’s attributes. Then the
total utility of a location with observed characteristics Xsdt is given by
Uisdt = Xsdtβ + uisdt. (2.2)
In order to estimate the parameters of this model, one needs to make an as-
sumption about the distribution of the error terms. McFadden (1974) demon-
strated that if each uisdt is independently and identically distributed Type I ex-
treme value, β can be estimated consistently by running maximum likelihood con-
ditional logit models on the individual-level data. This approach is commonly
adopted by other authors investigating the location choices of new immigrants (e.g.
Bartel 1989, Kaushal 2005, Jaeger 2007). Yet, the required assumption almost surely
fails. In particular, there are most likely unobserved city attributes that have similar
value to all immigrants from the same source region (uisdt = ηsdt+εisdt). Maintaining
the assumptions required for conditional logit estimation thus creates two problems.
First, assuming i.i.d. errors in the presence of these grouped unobserved compo-
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nents will vastly understate the standard errors and lead to faulty inference. More
importantly, if these unobserved factors are correlated with the observed attributes,
estimates of the value of these attributes will be inconsistent.
My empirical approach improves upon previous studies by explicitly allowing for
these unobserved components of the error term and taking steps to remove their
influence on the parameter estimates. I adopt a similar methodology to the one
presented in Scanlon, Chernew, McLaughlin and Solon (2002), and my exposition
of the econometric model closely follows theirs. I first derive an expression relating
the share of immigrants selecting a particular city to the observed and unobserved
components of utility in any given time period. I then demonstrate how using data
on immigrants’ choices from multiple time periods can net out the influence of any
unobserved factors that are constant over time. Finally, I discuss how an instrumental
variables approach allows for consistent estimation of the effect of native competition
on immigrants’ location decisions even in the presence of time-varying unobserved
attributes that are correlated with native employment.
Allowing for common unobserved city attributes yields a new representation of
the utility offered by a city
Uisdt = Xsdtβ + ηsdt + εisdt. (2.3)
Note that this general framework nests the possibility that ηsdt = ηdt ∀s, i.e. the
city-specific attributes have similar value to immigrants from all source regions. I
will estimate models under both assumptions, but I use the most general form for
exposition. In order to estimate β, I make the much less restrictive assumption that
the εisdt are distributed i.i.d. Type I extreme value. In other words, conditional on the
observed attributes and any common omitted factors, the remaining individual-level
errors are well-behaved. Given this assumption, the probability that an immigrant
19










This expression closely parallels the probability arising in a conditional logit model
with the addition of the unobserved group effects in both the numerator and denom-
inator. In expectation, the share of immigrants selecting each destination will be
equal to these choice probabilities. In practice, the observed shares will differ from
the actual choice probabilities due to random sampling error. Let Ssdt represent the
observed share of immigrants from source s selection location d in year t. Then





Here νsdt is a mean-zero error term with variance that is inversely proportional to
the number of observations within an st cell. Taking logs of both sides yields
ln(Ssdt) = ln(e
Xsdtβ+ηsdt +Dstνsdt)− ln(Dst). (2.8)
Taking a first-order Taylor Series approximation around νsdt = 0 gives




This equation demonstrates that an appropriately transformed version of the share
of immigrants selecting a city will be approximately linear in the observed and un-
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observed attributes. If ηsdt were uncorrelated with native labor supply, β could be
estimated consistently directly from this cross-sectional specification, but this is un-
likely to be the case. More likely, some of these unobserved city attributes that are
attractive to immigrants will be correlated with native employment. To the extent
that many of these city attributes are fixed over time, using data from multiple time
periods can overcome part of this difficulty. The grouped error components can be
partitioned into factors fixed over time γsd and factors specific to each time period
ψsdt.
ηsdt = γsd + ψsdt (2.10)
Taking time differences of equation (2.9) eliminates the γsd term.




Even after taking time differences, however, OLS estimates of the effect of a
change in native employment on the change in immigrant share are likely to be
biased. These changes most likely do not represent exogenous changes in the labor
market competition new immigrants will face. For example, increases in demand for
low-skilled labor will increase native employment while at the same time attracting
more immigrants, biasing the coefficient upward.
I instead estimate equation (2.11) by instrumental variables, using the welfare
participation rate prior to reform as the excluded instrument. I include source-
specific intercepts to account for the ∆ ln(Ds) terms. Notice that in this specification
I cannot estimate the effect of attributes of a destination or source-destination pair
that are fixed over time, including factors commonly considered such as distance
and climate differences. Additionally, parameter estimates for attributes with little
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variation over time would not be well-identified. Many other covariates used routinely
in the literature fall into this latter category, including the location of previously-
arriving immigrants and the geographic distribution of potential ethnic group-based
network contacts. The inability to include these variables should not be considered
a limitation of the model. Instead, the primary advantage of this approach is that it
removes the influence of any unobserved aspect of a destination or source-destination
pair that is roughly constant across time.
I have motivated this estimation procedure as the appropriate methodology under
the assumptions of a particular discrete choice model. It is worth noting, however,
that previous work has used a very similar reduced-form specification even without
this structural derivation. Borjas (2001) used the ratio of the share of newly arriv-
ing immigrants to the share of earlier arriving immigrants as the dependent variable
in his analysis of whether new immigrants respond to state differences in wages.
Both his dependent variable and the one suggested by the discrete choice model
roughly represent proportional differences in cities’ immigrant share. Thus, even if
the assumptions underlying this particular discrete choice model are violated, my
chosen specification is very comparable with previous work. Yet there are distinct
advantages to the approach I use. First, if the assumptions of the discrete choice
model hold, then the parameters I estimate have more than a reduced form inter-
pretation. More importantly, the need for a source of exogenous variation in labor
market opportunities does not depend on the underlying structural or reduced-form
motivation. This paper represents an empirical advancement, therefore, as the first
to provide a source of such variation and to exploit it using instrumental variables.
The next section provides information on the data I use to estimate these models,
and the following section reports the results.
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2.4 Data
The five percent Public Use Microdata Samples of the 1980-2000 decennial cen-
suses provide the majority of the data for the analysis.9 I consider the location of
newly arriving adult immigrants ages 18-54, with at most a high school degree, not
living in group quarters. I classify a respondent as an immigrant if he/she is foreign-
born and is either a non-citizen or a naturalized citizen. New immigrants are those
who arrived in the US during the ten years prior to survey.10 I restrict the analysis
to immigrants from the eleven source regions listed in Table 2.2.11 This table shows
the distribution of sources across all three waves of the census. This distribution has
remained somewhat stable over the sample period with two exceptions: immigration
from Mexico increased, while immigration from European countries decreased.
Table 2.3 provides some basic descriptive statistics for this population. In each
census year, the total number of new immigrants is split almost evenly between
women and men. Most new immigrants are married and very few live alone as
household heads. These variables are quite similar across the different waves of the
census, suggesting that changes in the locations these immigrants choose are unlikely
due to household composition changes.
I consider the 156 largest MSAs within the continental US with a nonzero immi-
grant population in all three census years as potential locations for newly-arriving
immigrants, . These cities had an adult population (18-54) of at least 150,000 in
1990.12 For the basic specification, I treat the ηsdt terms as constant across all source
9I obtained the data from the iPUMS project at the University of Minnesota Population Center
http://usa.ipums.org/usa/
10These immigrants may have previously lived in the United States, but the census question asks when the
respondent arrived in the US “to stay”.
11This eliminates less than three percent of the sample.
12The geographic boundaries of the MSAs change somewhat across waves of the census. I follow Card and Lewis
(2005) and use state and county group codes to create consistent areas across the three census years. Ethan Lewis
graciously provided programs to do so.
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regions. The dependent variable in these specifications is the natural logarithm of
the share of all new immigrants living in each city, calculated separately for each
census decade. I use person-level weights to calculate these shares, which I calculate
separately by gender.
I then match these city-level shares with a number of locational attributes (listed
in Table 2.4) immigrants may consider when deciding where to locate. The pri-
mary variable of interest is the native female employment rate: the fraction of all
women working positive weeks over the past year. The excluded instrument in the
IV specifications is the welfare participation rate: the fraction of all women who
received positive welfare benefits during the year prior to the survey. In addition to
other variables directly calculated from the PUMS, I include information from two
external data sources. First I include decade averages of the annual growth rate in
employment as measured in the County Business Patterns data from 1980-2000.13
This variable serves as a measure of the overall strength of the local labor market.
Additionally, I have information on the welfare generosity of the state in which each
MSA is located. PRWORA instituted a five-year waiting period for federally-funded
welfare benefits for all immigrants arriving after the enactment of the law in August
of 1996. Some states chose to use additional state funding to restore benefits to
this group (the full list is available in Zimmermann and Tumlin (1999)). Although
previous work has found that immigrants do not choose locations in order to take
advantage of these differential benefit restorations (Kaushal 2005), I include these
variables in some specifications for robustness.
Later specifications allow for the η terms to differ across each of the source regions
listed in Table 2.2. For this set of results, I calculate the share of new immigrants
13I aggregate these data from the county level to match the consistent geographic boundaries.
24
in a city separately by source region. I eliminate from the entire panel any source-
destination pair that contains no immigrants in any of the census years. The number
of observations varies among source regions, and the share of immigrants selecting
each city will be more precisely estimated for those regions with more observations.
To address the resulting heteroskedasticity, I weight each source-destination pair
by the square root of the total number of observations from each source country.
Because native female employment and welfare participation only vary at the MSA
level, I report standard errors clustered by MSA in all specifications with multiple
observations per city.
2.5 Results
Figure 2.3 displays the first-stage and reduced form results of a basic instrumental
variables version of Equation 2.11. Each city contributes one equally weighted obser-
vation. The left panel plots the data used to fit the first stage regression, along with
the fitted values. As hypothesized, cities with higher welfare participation prior to
reform experienced greater increases in native female employment over the decade.
The second panel shows the reduced form, and provides evidence consistent with the
selection hypothesis: Relative to immigrants arriving over the 1980s, female immi-
grants arriving during the 1990s were less likely to choose cities with large native
populations entering the workforce as a result of welfare reform. Figures 2.4 and 2.5
show this relationship geographically. These maps demonstrate that the relationship
is not driven by any particular area; instead, the relationship holds broadly across the
entire country. In each figure darker areas represent MSAs with values above than
the median, and lighter areas represent areas with values below the median. Areas
of the country not included in large MSAs are represented as white. The negative
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relationship is apparent when looking from map to map as cities turn from light to
dark and vice versa.
The parameter estimates from this specification are given in the second column
of Table 2.5. As expected given the figures, the first-stage is strongly significant (the
F-statistic on the excluded instrument is well in excess of 10), and the resulting IV
estimate is significantly negative. Interpreting the sign and statistical significance of
these coefficients is straightforward. The magnitude can be interpreted as roughly
the percentage change in the probability that an immigrant selects a given city.14
The coefficient in column 2 thus says that a city experiencing a one percentage point
welfare-reform-induced increase in native female labor supply saw roughly a twenty
percent decrease in the probability that a female immigrant chose to locate there.
The magnitude of the change in the level of the choice probabilities depends on the
base rate.
To contrast the IV results, the first column of the table shows the results from
estimating this same equation without an instrument. This coefficient is significantly
more positive, consistent with the hypothesis that omitted variables such as the
overall strength of the labor market tend both to increase native employment and to
attract newly arriving immigrants. This difference highlights the importance of using
exogenous variation to determine the extent to which immigrants avoid competing
with natives.
Figure 2.6 shows the results of repeating this set of regressions using data from
one decade prior. Importantly, neither the first stage nor the reduced form relation-
ships hold in a time period without a dramatic change to welfare policy (both point
14The percentage change in the choice probability resulting from a one unit change in the independent variable is
eβ∆X−1
∆X
, or approximately β for small changes in X. This interpretation provides the reduced form interpretation.
Based on the discrete choice model, the change in the odds that a city is selected resulting from a one unit change
in X is p(1− p)β. With small probabilities (the mean is 1/156), the difference between these two interpretations is
minimal.
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estimates are slightly negative, and neither is statistically significant). The lack of
a first-stage relationship over this period rules out certain alternative hypotheses for
the employment increases over the 1990s. For example, suppose high welfare par-
ticipation were indicative of poor labor market conditions and that the subsequent
increases in labor supply were the result of negatively serially correlated shocks. The
first-stage results over the 1980s provide no support for this hypothesis. Similarly,
the reduced form results rule out a pre-existing trend as an explanation for the
changes in immigrant share seen over the period when the policy was implemented.
This pair of results strengthens the credibility of interpreting the relationships shown
in Figure 2.3 as resulting from immigrants avoiding labor market competition with
welfare leavers.
The remainder of Table 2.5 adds additional control variables to help rule out
alternative hypotheses. As a first alternative, suppose that high welfare participation
cities also experienced larger general declines in job creation over the 1990s. In
this case, these cities would have lost immigrant share even if immigrants did not
react to the increases in native labor supply. Column 3 includes the change in the
decade average annual employment growth rate as a means of controlling for this
potentially omitted factor. This variable enters the model with the expected sign;
the distribution of immigrants shifted away from cities with slowing employment
growth and toward cities with improving growth. The parameter estimate for native
female supply is not substantially affected, however, suggesting that changes in job
growth cannot explain the relationship between pre-reform welfare participation and
a city’s change in immigrant share.
Alternatively, suppose that high participation cities also tended be traditional
locations for immigrants. If traditional locations became less popular for reasons
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unrelated to welfare reform then these cities would have lost immigrant share even
in the absence of the policy-driven labor supply increases. For example, the value
of network contacts could have declined, or there could have been a simple secular
diffusion of immigrants across the country over this time period for another unob-
served reason. The specification in column 4 addresses this alternative hypothesis.
An immigrant arriving in the 1990s faced a very similar geographic distribution of
previously arriving immigrants as did an immigrant arriving in the 1980s. The coef-
ficient on the fraction of a city that was foreign-born in 1990, therefore, gives a good
estimate of the difference in the value these two groups of immigrants placed on going
to a traditional location. The estimate provides support for the diffusion hypothe-
sis as the immigrant share enters with a negative coefficient. Yet the coefficient on
native employment remains negative and significant. In fact, even though the point
estimate falls in magnitude, the inclusion of this variable increases the precision of
the estimates substantially, yielding even stronger statistical significance.
The time differencing strategy effectively removes the influence of any unobserved
city attributes that are fixed over time. Yet there may still be unobserved city-level
shocks that are correlated with the reform-induced supply increases. One way to
address this potential source of bias is to include a city’s change in immigrant share
among a group that should be less affected by welfare reform as a control variable.
To accomplish this, I include the change in the city’s share of female immigrants with
at least some college education. Consistent with the presence of unobserved factors,
this variable enters with a positive sign and strong significance (column 5), but the
coefficient of interest remains strongly negative. Thus, any alternative explanation of
the shift away from high welfare participation cities must explain the larger impact
on low-skilled immigrants.
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The final column addresses the so-called “welfare magnets” hypothesis. Previous
research contends that states with more generous welfare benefits attract larger in-
flows of potentially eligible immigrants (Borjas 1999). Suppose that welfare reform
essentially “turned off” these magnets, and as a result, cities in generous states were
no longer especially attractive to immigrants. This direct policy effect offers an alter-
native explanation for the losses in immigrant share these cities experienced. To test
this theory, in the last specification I include the maximum benefit level for a family
of three in 1990. The positive coefficient on this variable is inconsistent with this
alternative hypothesis. I also include dummy variables for whether a state restored
each of four programs to post-reform legal immigrants using its own funds. The re-
sulting coefficients are variable and mostly insignificant. These results are consistent
with a previous study that found no effect of these policy choices on immigrants’
location choices (Kaushal 2005). With no evidence to support the welfare magnets
hypothesis, the labor market competition explanation for these patterns becomes
even more likely.
Table 2.6 repeats each of the previous specifications using changes in the log of
the low-skilled male immigrant share as the dependent variable. The broad pattern
is quite similar to the results for women - nearly all the variables enter with similar
signs. Given the different degree of overlap in occupation and industry by gender seen
in Table 2.1, one should expect that a given increase in employment among native
women represents a greater increase in competition for female immigrants than for
males. In the specifications with control variables, the point estimate of the negative
effect of an increase in native female employment is somewhat smaller than for female
immigrants, although the two coefficients cannot be statistically distinguished from
each other.
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There are several potential explanations for the similar coefficients for men and
women. First, many male immigrants may make location decisions together with a
spouse or other female family member. If the employment prospects are poor for one
member, the entire unit may decide to go to an alternative location. Male immigrants
considering marriage prospects may respond to the choices made by women even if
they are not already connected as one household.
Second, although men and women on average work in different occupations, the
expected male migration response to native welfare leavers depends on which jobs the
marginal male immigrant is likely to take. Suppose, for example, that men first look
for employment in traditional male jobs such as construction or agriculture work,
and take service jobs only when these first two alternatives are unavailable. Given
a sufficient number of these marginal male workers, a response similar in magnitude
to female workers is not unreasonable.
Finally, if men are simply more elastic in deciding where to locate, the male
response to any given supply shock will be larger. Even if welfare reform created
smaller increases in competition for men, a larger proportional male response would
tend to offset the difference in observed displacement. This difference in elasticity
could occur if women depend more heavily on the existence of network contacts in
deciding where to locate.
Table 2.7 presents a similar series of regressions for female immigrants using
source-specific shares as the dependent variable. In this specification, each city may
have as many as eleven observations, one for each source region identified in Table
2.2. In columns (4) through (6), I replace the generic immigrant concentration vari-
able from Table 2.5 with a measure of whether the city was a traditional location for
immigrants from the specific source region. The results through all specifications are
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quite similar to the results from Table 2.5. Even controlling for unobserved source-
specific city attributes, there is significant evidence that female immigrants chose
cities with smaller native supply increases.
Table 2.8 lists the coefficient and standard error from running the specification
in column 4 of Table 2.7 separately by source country. Although these coefficients
are imprecisely measured, there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the magnitude of
the point estimates. One noteworthy dimension of similarity is that the strongest
results tend to be clustered in source regions whose migrants are most likely to be
unauthorized. This pattern is not surprising, given the types of visa categories avail-
able to legal immigrants. Women entering the country on a family reunification visa
are likely to settle wherever those family members are living, regardless of differ-
ences in employment prospects. Similarly, immigrants sponsored by employers are
unlikely to respond to differences in generalized employment prospects because they
already have an offer for employment in one particular area. An increase in native
labor supply should have a muted effect on these populations. While the statisti-
cal imprecision does not allow for precise conclusions on the effects across different
source countries, the pattern of the point estimates suggest that the most flexible
populations were the most responsive to the labor supply shocks.
Table 2.9 presents a final specification check. The native supply increases created
by welfare reform occurred primarily in the latter half of the decade. If the labor
market competition explanation is correct, women arriving early in the decade should
be less affected. To create this table, I estimate the specification from column 4 of
Table 2.5 separately for three different groups. The first group consists of women
who arrived prior to 1995 and who are currently living in the same MSA as in
1995. The second group includes all women who made their most recent location
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decision after 1995. This group contains both immigrants arriving in the US after
1995 and early arrivers who have subsequently changed MSAs. The final group
consists only of the movers subsample. Because I do not have access to a measure
of native female employment changes at this five-year interval, I report the reduced
form coefficients. For reference, the reduced form coefficient from Table 2.5, column
(4) that uses women arriving over the entire sample period is -0.065. Again, the
results are consistent with the labor market competition explanation as the location
decisions of later arrivers and internal movers are much more negatively correlated
with pre-reform welfare participation.
Taken as a whole, the results in this section provide strong support for interpret-
ing the changing distribution of immigrants’ locations as resulting from immigrants
avoiding competing with natives. One final question concerns the extent to which
these changing location patterns effectively “undid” the labor supply shocks created
by welfare reform. Figure 2.7 presents a back of the envelope calculation in response
to this question, based on the IV regression results in Table 2.5, column 4. On
the x-axis is the predicted increase in native female labor supply based on the first
stage regression, measured as a fraction of the low-skilled female population in 1990.
The y-axis displays “extra” working female immigrants as predicted by the model,
also measured as a fraction of the low-skilled female native population in 1990. The
“extra” working immigrants variable is the difference between the predicted number
of immigrants entering a city based using actual welfare participation rates and the
predicted number who would have entered if all cities had the same participation
rate (the mean).15 The slope of the linear regression line is -0.83. On average, when
15Specifically, this variable is
(e∆̂ln(S)actual−e∆̂ln(S)mean )(S1990)(Imm2000)
Pop1990
, where Imm2000 is the total number
of new female immigrants who are in the labor force, ∆̂ln(S)actual is the fitted value from the regression, and
∆̂ln(S)mean is the fitted value replacing the actual participation rate with the mean, but leaving the other variables
at their original values.
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a city experiences a native supply increase equivalent to one percent of its previous
workforce, immigrants equivalent to 0.83 percent of the previous workforce choose
alternative locations. This calculation suggests that changing immigration patterns
diffused most of the supply shocks created by welfare reform throughout the country.
2.6 Discussion and Implications for Further Research
This paper provides evidence that immigrants function as labor market arbi-
trageurs, differentially selecting areas with better employment prospects. Welfare
reform substantially increased the labor market participation of previous recipients,
and immigrants who are likely to compete with these new labor market entrants
chose to locate in areas with less affected labor markets. Additional evidence helps
rule out a number of alternative explanations for this pattern, including pre-existing
trends away from these cities, concurrent demand increases, a secular decline in the
value of traditional locations, and other unobserved shocks that affect immigrants of
all skill levels similarly. After addressing each of these concerns, the data continue
to provide support for a labor market competition interpretation of these changing
location patterns.
This finding has important implications beyond the specific context examined
in this study. Previous papers study the effect of immigration on the native wage
structure using immigration flows as a source of exogenous changes to a city’s skill
distribution. Despite theoretical predictions to the contrary, these studies typically
find very small differences between cities receiving large immigrant inflows and com-
parison cities. Critics note that these comparisons are not very informative in a
general equilibrium context, i.e. when local labor markets are not closed. In par-
ticular, when a mobile production factor is willing to move across cities in search
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of the highest return, geographic differences in the wage structure will tend to dis-
sipate. Although some authors suggested that immigrants, as a self-selected group
of mobile workers, might serve this function, no previous study had provided a di-
rect test of whether immigrants respond to differences in labor market opportunities
using a source of plausibly exogenous variation. Future research should continue
to explore the extent of immigrants’ mobility in response to other exogenous labor
market shocks. If the conclusions of this study hold in general, it is likely that a new
empirical strategy will be required to identify the precise effect of immigration on
the native wage structure.
On the other hand, these results provide new evidence of an often overlooked
gain from immigration. Immigrants selectively choosing locations can quickly diffuse
labor market shocks across the country. Sufficiently large immigration flows can
rapidly bring the labor market back to geographic equilibrium without more costly
migration by natives. This benefit of immigration is seldom discussed in the policy
debate, and future research providing an estimate of its magnitude would play an
important role in determining the overall implications of this line of research for
policy makers.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Newly Arriving Immigrants as Labor Market Arbitrageurs:
Evidence from the Minimum Wage
3.1 Introduction
This paper contributes to a growing literature demonstrating that newly arriving
immigrants select destinations within the United States based, in part, on differences
in labor market conditions. This type of selection spreads out labor market shocks
across the country and helps equalize labor market returns across geography. The
existence of such a highly mobile, earnings-sensitive low-skilled population affects
the way researchers should evaluate the effect of labor market policies and shocks.
An often-used methodology compares outcomes in an affected city or state to similar
areas unaffected by the policy. This methodology implicitly assumes that each labor
market is closed, and thus that the unaffected market provides a good estimate
of what would have occurred in the affected market in the absence of the policy.
A large flow of earnings-senstive immigrants, however, will tend to minimize the
observed differences across geography. In the limit, sufficiently flexible labor market
arbitrageurs would eliminate any predictable differences in labor market returns.
Yet most researchers do not directly take account of this possibility, perhaps
because most previous attempts to determine directly the extent of immigrants’
geographic selection fail to do so convincingly. Only one previous study uses iden-
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tifiable exogenous variation in the earnings an immigrant can expect to earn across
locations (Cadena 2008). Other studies are therefore subject to the criticism that
immigrants’ observed location patterns are simply a response to other unobserved
locational characteristics that are correlated with favorable labor market outcomes
(Borjas 2001, Jaeger 2007).
I overcome this challenge to identification by examining how the distribution of
newly arriving immigrants’ destinations responds to differences in states’ minimum
wage policy from 1994 to 2007. I begin by determining theoretically how changes
in the minimum wage should affect the location immigrants prefer when they are
searching for employment. I adopt a simple model with two labor markets (states),
each with its own minimum wage. The model initially provides an ambiguous pre-
diction for how immigrants should respond when one state increases its minimum
wage. The effect of the policy change on expected earnings depends on the labor
demand elasticity and the rate at which workers separate from their jobs. I measure
the labor demand elasticity using much less mobile native teenagers and find that
demand is roughly unit-elastic in the neighborhood of the observed minimum wage
levels. This estimate, in combination with the model, results in a clear prediction
that immigrants should prefer states with unchanged minimum wages.
The remainder of the empirical analysis then evaluates this prediction. I take ad-
vantage of variables providing information on nativity and year of arrival that were
added to the core of the Current Population Survey (CPS) in 1994. This time period
provides a particularly good opportunity to evaluate the effect of state policies. In
response to a federal minimum wage that remained fixed in nominal terms for nearly
a decade, a majority of states set higher minimums, and several enacted multiple
increases. The resulting mix of policies provides significant geographic variation in
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both the timing and the dollar amount of the minimum wage across multiple labor
markets. This exceptional variation allows me to use an empirical framework that re-
moves the influence influence of unobserved state characteristics, the general increase
of the immigrant population, and state-specific trends in the immigrant population.
I find strong, significant evidence in favor of the hypothesis that immigrants choose
destinations that maximize expected earnings1. A ten percent increase in a state’s
minimum wage leads to a seven percent decrease in the number of newly arriving
immigrants who live in that state.
As a falsification test, I repeat the analysis using higher educated immigrants who
generally command market wages significantly above any state’s minimum wage. The
location pattern of this group is uncorrelated with changes in states’ minimum wage
policies. The lack of a correlation for the high skilled immigrants supports inter-
preting the results for the low-skilled group as an optimizing response to changes in
labor market conditions. Together, these findings support the idea that immigrants’
endogenous location selection tends to minimize the difference in labor market out-
comes across geography.
One literature in which this possibility features prominently is the empirical de-
bate over the effect of immigration on native labor market outcomes. The potential
for this type of selection is one of the primary criticisms of studies that rely on
geography-based research designs to determine how the change in skill mix created
by immigrants affects the wage distribution.2 The extent of the selection document
1Orrenius and Zavodny (forthcoming) study the effect of minimum wages on labor market outcomes for immigrants
and conclude that immigrants experience smaller disemployment effects than do native workers. They suggest that
immigrants moving away from states that increase their minimums may account for the different effects, and they
present some suggestive evidence that this type of selection is occurring. In contrast to my analysis, however, their
paper does not address the question of whether this type of behavior represents an optimizing choice for newly
arriving immigrants. Nor do they explore the broader implications of such selection on local and national labor
markets and on researchers’ attempts to use geographic variation to evaluate the response to labor market policies
and shocks.
2See Card (1990) and Card and Lewis (2005) for examples of studies that use this type of variation, and Borjas
et al. (1997), Borjas (2003) and Borjas et al. (2006) for studies that allege this criticism.
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in this paper casts doubt on the usefulness of geographic comparisons in determining
the effect of immigration on the native wage distribution.
Additionally, this paper contributes to the local labor markets literature by pro-
viding new evidence that the geographic flexibility of low-skilled immigrants serves
as an especially important mechanism in restoring geographic equilibrium following
labor market shocks. This finding is especially important given the increased in-
equality that can result from the relatively low mobility rates of low-skilled natives
(Bound and Holzer 2000).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the
model with an emphasis on the empirical parameters necessary to form a prediction;
Section 3.3 contains the empirical work, and Section 3.4 concludes and discusses
policy implications.
3.2 Model
This section adopts the two-sector model of Mincer (1976) to determine whether
a binding increase in one state’s minimum wage will create incentives for newly
arriving immigrants to flow toward or away from that state’s labor market. The
analysis assumes that this policy change will generate unemployment in addition
to raising wages. These two changes in labor market conditions will have opposing
effects on that state’s desirability as a destination for newly arriving immigrants. The
model demonstrates that predicting which state immigrants should prefer requires
an estimate of two labor market parameters: the labor demand elasticity and the
turnover rate. I estimate these parameters in the empirical section, and the results
imply that an increase in the minimum wage will cause expected earnings for new




The basic model begins with a fixed set of workers who inelastically supply one
unit of labor in one of two states. Workers are free to move from state to state to
maximize their expected earnings, but each worker must choose one and only one
state in which to search for employment. Mincer originally motivated the model as
describing the equilibrium wage and employment dynamics of covered and uncov-
ered sectors within the same geographic area. The assumption that workers cannot
simultaneously search for employment in both sectors is difficult to justify in this
original setting and alternatives have been proposed (Brown 1999). In the present
geographic context, however, this assumption more closely reflects reality as workers
need to move to another state in order to search for employment covered by the
higher minimum wage.3
A geographic equilibrium requires equal expected earnings for new entrants in
both markets. If one state has a higher minimum wage, searching workers in that
state must have a lower probability of finding employment. When differences in
the probability perfectly offset differences in wages, no worker has an incentive to
move. My analysis begins at such an initial equilibrium and then determines the
resulting migration incentives when only one state increases its minimum wage.4 I
begin by determining whether expected earnings would rise or fall in the state with
the increased minimum wage if no workers were to move. This answer generates
a straightforward migration prediction: workers will flow from the state with lower
expected earnings toward the state with higher expected earnings. In doing so, they
3Todaro (1969) describes a similar dynamic in the context of a developing country where the jobs covered by the
minimum wage are located in an urban area that is geographically distant from the rural uncovered jobs.
4This analysis differs slightly from Mincer’s presentation as his assumed that the other market was entirely
uncovered by any minimum wage.
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alter the probabilities of finding employment in each state until the expected earnings
equalize.
Formally, a worker’s expected income is the probability of finding employment
multiplied by the wage paid conditional on finding employment. The wage is simply
the binding minimum wage in each state.
E[I] = p(w) · w. (3.1)
Here I denotes income, w is the minimum wage, and p is the probability of
finding employment. I also adopt Mincer’s (1976) version of the probability of finding
employment. Job vacancies are created through exogenous separations. In each
period, there are δE vacancies, where E denotes the number of employees firms
demand at the minimum wage and δ represents the fraction of employees who lose
their jobs in any period. The set of searching workers includes both those who are
recently separated, and workers who were unemployed over the previous period, U .
Because the minimum wage binds, there will be unemployed workers in the pool of
job seekers. With more searching workers than vacancies, I assume that each job
opening is randomly allocated. The resulting probability that a searching worker





To determine whether a state’s increase in the minimum wage will increase ex-
pected earnings for workers searching in that state, I take the derivative of expected
earnings with the respect to the minimum wage and evaluate the resulting expression










∣∣∣∣wm = wm0 ] , (3.3)
Here, the superscript m denotes the state that raised its minimum wage, and wm0
represents the minimum wage prior to the increase.
When this derivative is positive, expected earnings increase and workers will have
an incentive to migrate toward the state that increased its minimum. Workers will
flow toward the other state when this expression is negative. The following propo-
sition summarizes how the change in expected earnings depends on both the labor
demand elasticity (η) and the turnover rate (δ).
Proposition III.1. In the absence of mobility, and with inelastic labor supply, an
increase in one state’s minimum wage will increase expected earnings and attract








The proof involves simple algebraic manipulation of the derivative of expected
earnings and is provided in the appendix for the interested reader.
This expression says that, for a given increase in the binding wage floor, labor
markets with smaller demand elasticities and higher turnover rates are more likely
to experience an increase in expected earnings, and thus to attract geographically
mobile workers. The elasticity result fits well with intuition. A less elastic demand
curve means a smaller fall in desired employment, leading both to a smaller decrease
in the number of vacancies in each period and a smaller increase in the number of
new unemployed workers joining the pool of searchers. Together, these effects result
in a smaller decrease in the probability of finding employment.
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The intuition for the separation rate is less straightforward. Conditional on the
same changes in employment and unemployment, a higher separation rate leads to
a larger decrease in vacancies but also results in a smaller increase in job seekers.
The latter effect always dominates, however, and the interested reader is directed to
a formal proof in the appendix (Section 3.6.2).
Figure 3.1 provides a graphical summary of how these two parameters jointly
determine the effect on expected wages. The upward sloping line shows the values
of η and δ such that expected earnings in the state with the increased minimum
wage are unchanged. Along this line, no workers need to move in order to restore
geographic equilibrium. For parameter pairs above the line, equilibrium requires
that workers flow away from the state with the higher minimum wage. The opposite
flow is necessary for parameter pairs below the line. This figure is drawn for a
particular value of pre-change unemployment. A larger unemployment level in the
initial equilibrium would increase the intercept and decrease the slope. The point
(δ = 1, η = 1) will always lie on the line.
This general result nests the particular situation examined by Mincer (1976) when
neither sector has a minimum wage in the initial equilibrium. In that case, there is
no unemployment prior to the implementation of the minimum wage, and workers
will flow to the minimum wage state whenever δ > η. Also of note, when turnover
is complete in every period (δ = 1), workers will be attracted to an increase in
the minimum wage whenever labor demand is inelastic. However, when workers
currently holding jobs have a higher probability of employment in the next period
than do unemployed workers, an increase in the minimum wage will only lead to
inflows for a restricted range of elasticities less than one (in absolute value).
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3.2.2 Possible Extensions
The preceding analysis was developed under a number of restrictive assumptions.
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, I briefly discuss how relaxing a few
key assumptions would affect the relationship found in Equation 3.4. The basic
search model I present has only one period. Introducing multiple periods could easily
increase the importance immigrants place on the probability of finding employment
beyond its role in expected earnings. If, for example, immigrants face liquidity
constraints, failing to find employment quickly will have an especially high cost.
Additionally, if immigrants intend to return home after a short spell of work abroad,
they may be especially unwilling to risk a long period of unemployment. Each of
these additional considerations would move the cutoff line from Figure 3.1 vertically
down, resulting in a smaller set of parameters under which minimum wage increases
will attract immigrants.
I have also assumed that the turnover rate is unaffected by the minimum wage. If
an increase in the minimum wage reduced turnover, the effect of the minimum wage
on the probability of finding employment would be more negative and the cutoff line
would again shift vertically down.
Additionally, I have assumed an inelastic total labor supply and thus that an
increase in the minimum wage does not induce any state residents to enter or exit
the labor force. If workers instead have a range of reservation expected earnings
levels, new workers already living in a state could join the labor force if expected
earnings rose as a result of the minimum wage. Similarly, workers with the highest
reservations wages could exit the labor force if expected earnings fell. Assuming that
these workers respond more quickly than potential migrants from the other state,
an elastic labor supply within a state would result in a larger set of parameters for
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which no workers would want to move across state lines. The line of indifference in
Figure 3.1 would be replaced by a larger zone of indifference surrounding the line
above and below. Relaxing this assumption, however, will not reverse the sign of the
prediction.
The above discussion has assumed that immigrants maximize earnings, rather
than utility. Suppose that instead of supplying labor perfectly inelasticly, immigrants
value their leisure time. Then immigrants may actually prefer a state with lower
expected earnings, if those earnings are accompanied by lower expected work effort.
Thus, a given decrease in a state’s employment probability will not have as large
of an effect on that state’s attractiveness as a destination. This modification would
move the cutoff line vertically upward, increasing the range of elasticities for which
a minimum wage increase makes a state more attractive.
The first portion of the empirical section reveals a near unit-elastic labor demand
elasticity. Earnings maxizing immigrants should flow away from states that increase
their minimum wage, although the prediction is somewhat less clear for immigrants
who value leisure. Further analysis at the end of the section confirms that they
respond in accordance with the earnings maximization prediction.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
This section begins by evaluating a key assumption from the model; I demonstrate
that the minimum wage binds on the wages of a significant fraction of newly-arrived
low-skilled immigrants. I then discuss how numerous policy changes enacted by the
states during the period for which immigration status is available in the CPS (1994-
2007) provide an excellent environment for estimating the effect of these policies. I
first obtain an estimate of the labor demand elasticity in the minimum wage sector
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by examining changes in native teen employment and wages in response to minimum
wage increases. Teens are a fairly immobile group, and thus their results provide
a rough estimate of the labor demand elasticity under no mobility. The estimated
demand elasticity is sufficiently large to suggest that for any empirically reasonable
rate of turnover immigrants should prefer locating states with unchanged minimum
wages. I then provide direct evidence that immigrants alter their location decisions
in accordance with the theory’s prediction and test the robustness of this finding.
3.3.1 Immigrants’ Wages Are Bound By the Minimum Wage
The model in the preceding section relies on the assumption of a binding mini-
mum wage. Thus, the minimum wage must affect the wages of a significant fraction
of newly arriving immigrants’ wages in order for the theoretical predictions to have
empirical relevance. Figure 3.2 displays kernel densities of wage distributions within
a narrow window around minimum wage increases and provides straightforward ev-
idence that this condition is satisfied.
To estimate these distributions, I select from each month of the CPS Outgoing
Rotation Group (ORG) all hourly workers who live in a state with a minimum wage
that will increase within six months or with a minimum wage that increased fewer
than six months ago. I pool observations from all effective minimum wage changes –
changes that increase the maximum of the state or federal minimum – from 1994 to
2007, the period over which nativity information is included. I then limit the sample
to recently arriving immigrants (fewer than ten years in the US) and native teenagers
(16-19). For each worker, I calculate the difference between the log of his/her hourly
wage and the log of the new minimum hourly wage. I then estimate separate kernel
densities of the distribution of this difference before and after the minimum wage
61
increase.5 In each panel, the solid line shows the distribution for workers in months
prior to the minimum wage increase, and the dotted line represents workers in the
six months following the increase.
The distributions change exactly as one would expect under a binding minimum
wage. Comparing the new to the old distribution among newly arriving immigrants,
there is a pronounced spike at the new minimum with “missing” density below the
new minimum. While minimum wage jobs make up a smaller fraction of the immi-
grant wage distribution when compared to native teens, the magnitude of the spike
created by the minimum wage is comparable. Figure 3.3 provides an additional point
of reference and demonstrates that the minimum wage has only a modest effect on
the wages of native adult workers without a high school degree.
It is clear from this analysis that the wages of many newly arriving immigrants
are affected by the wage floor. In fact, the change in the immigrant wage distribution
closely mirrors the results for the group on which most empirical research has focused.
It is reasonable to expect, therefore, that immigrants will respond to any changes in
expected earnings created by minimum wage policies.
3.3.2 State Minimum Wage Policies Provide Excellent Variation
The goal of the empirical analysis is to determine whether immigrants act as
expected earnings maximizers in selecting destinations. In the ideal experimental
context, a researcher would first observe both the probability of finding employment
and the expected wage conditional on employment across a number of potential
destinations. Then, one could randomly assign changes in both attributes to each
destination and measure the resulting change in the geographic distribution of new
immigrants.
5I use an Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 0.05 log points.
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State minimum wage policies over the past fifteen years provide a sufficiently close
approximation to this ideal context. As discussed in the model, minimum wage poli-
cies will, in general, manipulate expected earnings. Additionally, although minimum
wage increases are not random events, sufficient variation both in the timing and in
the magnitude of minimum wages will allow for an identification strategy that elim-
inates the influence of unobserved location characteristics that are fixed over time
as well as characteristics that are changing similarly over time across all locations.
Eliminating these potential confounding influences provides a closer approximation
to the ideal experimental approach.
Figure 3.4 summarizes state and federal minimum wage policy from 1979-2007.
The solid line displays the inflation-adjusted level of the federal minimum wage.
The graph also displays the dollar amount and effective month of each new state
minimum that is higher than the federal level, represented by the state’s two-letter
abbreviation. All wage levels are adjusted to December 2007 dollars using the CPI-
U. Although data limitations preclude examining the effect of the minimum wage on
immigrants’ behavior prior to 1994, the figure reveals that most of the geographic
variation in policies occurs when immigrants are identifiable. By the late 2000s, the
range of minimums across geography rivals the time-series variation in the federal
minimum between 1979 and the mid-1990s, the time period often studied in the
canonical minimum wage and employment literature.6 Yet because each of these
policy decisions was made at the state level, much less of this variation comes from
the slow, predictable decline over time in the value of the federal minimum wage
due to inflation. Using geographic variation is therefore less likely to attribute to
the minimum wage changes in employment that are simply the result of unobserved
6Brown (1999) has a list of such studies on p. 2116.
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gradual shifts in the nation’s economy.
Table 3.1 provides additional evidence that these policies are varied and substan-
tial. The first column displays the percentage of months between January 1994 and
December 2007 that each state’s minimum exceeded the federal minimum. The ma-
jority of states (31) had higher minimums than the federal level for at least part of
the period. The second column shows the average gap between the state and federal
minimums in months when the the state minimum was binding. These differences
are sizable, with most 15 to 25 percent higher. The final column indicates the num-
ber of times the effective minimum wage increased in a state. Over this time period,
there were a total of 212 increases in the effective minimum wage, 106 of which were
created by state policy changes. The large number of changes allows for precise es-
timates of the effect of the minimum wage, even when using an estimation strategy
that accounts for the influence of unobserved state attributes, overall time trends
and state-specific time trends.
3.3.3 Estimation Strategy
My initial panel data specification is commonly used in the minimum wage and
employment literature.
Yst = α0 + log(RealMWst)β1 +Xstγ + τt + δs + δs ∗ t+ εst. (3.5)
Observations are at the state-month level (s denotes states, t denotes states),
and the cell means are calculated using CPS weights, while the regressions are un-
weighted.7 Standard errors are clustered at the state level, allowing for heteroskedas-
ticity and state-level serial correlation of unknown form. Xst is a vector of time-
7Weighted versions of the regressions are quite similar to the unweighted versions, and none of the substantive
conclusions are altered.
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varying covariates, τt are time(month) dummies, δs are state dummy variables and
δs∗t are state specific linear time trends. I use this specification to estimate the effect
of the minimum wage on a number of outcomes (Yst), which are discussed in more
detail below. In addition, Table 3.2 gives a complete description and descriptive
statistics for each dependent variable and covariate.
The real minimum wage is measured monthly and is the maximum of either the
state or federal minimum wage, unadjusted for coverage rates. I include the log
of the state’s average wage as a separate control variable, rather than using it to
form a ratio with the minimum wage. Card and Krueger (1995, pp.208-239) provide
compelling arguments that these choices are the preferred specification. A version of
this specification figures prominently in the debate between Neumark and Wascher
(1992) and Card, Katz and Krueger (1994). In contrast to these previous studies,
I run this specification over a time period with much more variation in minimum
wage policies (see Figure 3.4), and I run the analysis on the full set of monthly data
rather than on annual or once per year monthly data (the May CPS supplement).
Subsequent studies have also used this specification including Burkhauser, Couch
and Wittenburg (2000). These authors argue against the use of time dummies,
primarily because doing so eliminates the contribution of the federal minimum to the
variation in the effective minimum wage thus eliminating most of the variation. They
run auxiliary regressions of the minimum wage variable on several sets of dummy
variables and find that, during the period they study (1979-1992), nearly 90 percent
of the variation in the minimum wage can be explained by the year dummies alone
whereas state and month dummies account for less than five percent of the variation.
The analysis presented here uses policies from 1994-2007, and suffers much less from
this concern. Year dummies can explain only fifteen percent of the variation, and the
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inclusion of state, year and month dummies explains only 65 percent. Additionally,
previous studies omit the state-specific time trends. In the discussion surrounding
each specification, I discuss reasons to prefer the results that include the trends,
although I present results both with and without them for completeness.
Recall that the model provided a potentially ambiguous prediction for whether an
increase in the minimum wage will attract or repel immigrant workers. The direction
of the effect depends on both the elasticity of labor demand and the turnover rate
as shown in Figure 3.1. I first use this specification, therefore, to measure how the
minimum wage affects employment and wage variables, which I then use to calculate
an estimated labor demand elasticity.
To approximate the elasticity that would be observed without a migration re-
sponse (as required by the model), I examine the effect of the minimum wage on a
group of workers unlikely to move for employment: native teenagers (16-19). Table
3.3 tabulates data from the 2000 census to show the relative mobility of several demo-
graphic groups. Native teens and native adults without a high school degree are very
unlikely to move across state lines. More than 90 percent of each of these two groups
was living in the same state in 2000 as in 1995 (93 and 92 percent respectively). In
addition, it is difficult to imagine a household relocating based on a teenager’s em-
ployment prospects. In contrast, newly arriving immigrants are a much more mobile
portion of the labor force. Newly arriving immigrants have, by definition, recently
selected a new destination. Even among immigrants arriving more than five years
ago, only 85 percent were living in the same state in 2000 as they were in 1995.
Thus, the employment and wage effects from the immobile native teenagers can
provide a good estimate of how changes in the minimum wage affect the earnings the
more mobile immigrants can expect across destinations. The measured elasticity is
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sufficiently large to imply that earnings maximizing immigrants should prefer states
with smaller increases or fixed minimums. Using the same specification, and thus the
same portion of the policy variation, I demonstrate that minimum wage increases
lead to immigrant outflows.
3.3.4 The Demand Elasticity Using Native Teens
To form an estimate of the demand elasticity, I estimate Equation 3.5 for a number
of teen outcome variables, and the results are given in Tables 3.4-3.7. Table 3.4
provides the results from the most common dependent variable used in the minimum
wage literature, the employment to population ratio. The primary parameter of
interest is β1, the coefficient on the minimum wage variable. The first three columns
give results for native teens, while columns 4-6 provide similar results for native adult
high school dropouts. Column 1 includes only state and time dummies as controls.
Column 2 adds controls and the third column adds the state-specific trends.
The trends are potentially quite important in the analysis of teen employment.
Over the relevant time period, the participation of teens in the labor market fell
dramatically (Aaronson, Park and Sullivan 2006). If this trend occurred at differ-
ent rates in states with different minimum wage policies, an empirical specification
lacking state-specific trends may erroneous attribute differences in employment to
differences in minimum wage policies.
Across all specifications, the measured effect on employment is small. In my pre-
ferred specification (column 3), the estimated coefficient of -0.029, while statistically
insignificant, implies that a ten percent increase in a state’s minimum wage leads to
a 0.0029 decrease in the teen employment to population ratio. With the mean of
the dependent variable at 0.44, the implied elasticity is -0.06.8 Thus a ten percent
8Calculating this elasticity directly as a regression coefficient using the log of the employment to population ratio
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increase in the minimum wage leads to a 0.6 percent decrease in the employment
to population ratio. This estimate is slightly smaller than typical results using time
series variation, although it is solidly within the widely varying estimates that come
from panel data specifications (Brown 1999). Results for native adults are similarly
clustered around zero.
At first blush, these results suggest that state minimum wage increases will at-
tract immigrant workers, given the negligible measured effects on employment. How-
ever, using this outcome measure is unlikely to provide an appropriate estimate of
the actual labor demand elasticity, a well-known limitation despite this variable’s
widespread use.9 First, not all teen workers’ wages are affected by the minimum wage.
As a result, this specification understates the employment decreases for the affected
population and overstates the wage increases. Brown (1999, p. 1214-1215) discusses
how these complementary measurement errors can easily lead to an estimated wage
elasticity of employment that is five to nine times too low. In addition, employers are
likely to adjust employment on both the intensive and extensive margins. Therefore,
a more appropriate measure of employment is hours per teenager rather than the
fraction of teenagers who are employed. Nevertheless, the conventionally measured
employment effects in column 1 are fully consistent with conventional estimates, im-
plying that there is nothing abnormal about this particular time period or policy
environment. The next set of results use alternative dependent variables that allow
for a better estimate of the actual labor demand elasticity in the neighborhood of
implemented minimum wages.
Table 3.5 continues to use estimate versions of the specification in Equation 3.5.
as the dependent variable yields a similar result.
9Despite this limitation, this specification may provide an appropriate measurement of a policy relevant parameter.
Policymakers often must decide whether to raise the minimum wage, and knowing that few workers will lose their
jobs is likely of direct interest.
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This table explicitly allows for adjustment by employers on both the intensive and
extensive margin. The dependent variable is the log of the mean hours per worker,
including zeros. Including workers with zero hours in these averages accounts for
the fact that positions may disappear entirely as employers scale back in response to
the minimum. These results show a larger elasticity for teenage workers across all
specifications, with the largest results in the third column that includes state trends.
The coefficient of -0.230 on the log of the minimum wage in the third column
implies that a ten percent increase in the minimum wage will lead to a 2.3 percent
decrease in the average hours worked by teenagers. This hours elasticity reveals
a much more substantial adjustment than the employment measure alone. Rather
than cutting employees, employers respond to increases in the minimum wage by
decreasing the hours of some employees.
The elasticities in Table 3.5 would correctly measure the labor demand elasticity
if the minimum wage were always binding for all teen workers. Although there
is a pronounced spike in the teen wage distribution at the minimum (see Figure
3.2), many teens command a market wage above the minimum while others can
legally work below the minimum. Table 3.6 measures the extent of this discrepancy
by regressing teens’ hourly wages on the minimum wage. The coefficient of 0.213
(column 3) implies that a ten percent increase in the minimum wage leads to only a
2.13 percent increase in the average teen worker’s hourly wage.
The hours and wage elasticities for teens are of roughly equal magnitude and
opposite sign, suggesting that employers respond to changes in the price of teen labor
by reducing total hours by enough to leave their wage bills unchanged. Table 3.7
demonstrates this fact directly using the log of average weekly earnings (including
zeros) as the dependent variable. The point estimate is essentially zero across all
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specifications, consistent with the hours and wages results. Taken together, the
results for native teenagers imply a roughly unit-elastic labor demand curve.
These results are consistent with the findings from a previous study that used
the alternative identification strategy of comparing year to year changes for work-
ers at different points in the wage distribution around the time of minimum wage
increases(Neumark, Schweitzer and Wascher 2004). That methodology also revealed
opposing effects on wages and hours with a net result of either no change or a slight
decrease in total earnings. That study included lagged levels of the minimum wage to
allow for a delayed response to the change in wages. As a specification check, Table
3.8 repeats each of these regressions including the minimum wage variable lagged
one quarter. I report results from specifications including the state-specific trends
(column 3 of Tables 3.4-3.7). The “cumulative” effect, the sum of the coefficients on
the contemporaneous and lagged terms, agrees nearly exactly with the results using
only the contemporaneous measure.
The labor demand elasticity revealed by this analysis, therefore, is sufficiently
large to eliminate most of the ambiguity from the model in Section 3.2. Figure
3.5 adds a reference line at η = 1 to Figure 3.1. The entire line lies in the range
of parameters under which earnings-maximizing workers will flow away from states
increasing their minimum wages in order to restore the geographic equilibrium across
labor markets.10
10There is a slight disconnect between the hours-based elasticity and the η and δ framework used in the model that
assumed unitary labor supply. One might argue that the expected earnings for a job seeker are roughly unchanged
because most of the labor adjustment occurs on the intensive margin and average earnings are unchanged. As
a result, minimum wage increases would not affect immigrants’ location choices. There are at least two plausible
modifications to the model that would restore the sharp prediction even when total employment and average earnings
are roughly unchanged by the minimum wage. First, if the increase in wages reduces churning by lowering the quit
rate and thus the hiring rate, the probability of finding employment will fall in the state that increased its minimum
wage. Alternatively, if the increase in hourly wage draws more workers into the labor force, the probability that a
searcher will find employment will also fall. Additionally, the measured response by immigrants is sufficiently large
to overcome this objection.
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3.3.5 Minimum Wage Increases Lead to Immigrant Outflows
Table 3.10 presents regression results demonstrating that newly arriving immi-
grants respond in exactly this way. The dependent variable in each regression is the
log of the number of newly arriving (within the past ten years) immigrants without
a HS degree living in a state in a given month.11 These are the same sample criteria
used to create Figure 3.2, which demonstrated that the minimum wage was binding
on a significant share of this group. The regression specification in the first column
omits covariates but includes all of the state and time dummies. Subsequent columns
add state-specific trends and additional controls.
The dummies and state-specific trends are essential to this analysis because of
the role they play in creating the counterfactual. The state dummies remove the
influence of any unobserved fixed state attributes that affect which destination newly
arriving immigrants select. The observed negative relationship, therefore, is not
simply driven by higher minimum wage states lacking other amenities immigrants
value. Similarly, the time dummies take account of the fact that successively larger
cohorts of immigrants were arriving over this time period.
The state trends are especially important in this specification in light of broader
patterns in immigrant settlement during this time period. Over the 1990s, the newly
arriving immigrant population became much less concentrated among traditional
destination states and cities compared to previous waves (Card and Lewis 2005).
To the extent that this diffusion occurred for reasons unrelated to policy-driven
differences in labor market prospects, this pattern presents an empirical challenge
to the analysis. Without the inclusion of state trends, one might be concerned
that the estimated negative relationship resulted simply from traditional destination
11These counts are weighted sums using the census-provided weights.
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states implementing earlier and larger increases in the minimum wage. In fact,
the specification in column 1 that omits state trends provides a substantially more
negative estimate of the effect of the minimum wage. Instead, the inclusion of state
trends ensures that the measured outflow of immigrants in response to a minimum
wage increase represents a deviation from the general increase or decrease in a state’s
popularity over time.
The results that include state trends are clustered around -0.7 and measure the
elasticity of the newly arrived immigrant population with respect to the minimum
wage. These estimates are strongly statistically significant, even after allowing for
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within state panels of unknown form (p <
0.05). The elasticity implies that when a state’s minimum wage increases by ten
percent, its newly arriving immigrant population falls by seven percent relative to the
counterfactual. Here the counterfactual is the level that would have been predicted
using the state’s average new immigrant population, the overall growth of the new
immigrant population over time and the state’s specific trend in the newly arriving
immigrant population.
3.3.6 Falsification Test Using Higher-Education Immigrants
Despite the inclusion of these dummies and trends to remove the influence of
unobserved factors, one might still be concerned that these geographic shifts in the
immigrant population would have occurred even in the absence of the differential
labor market prospects created by the minimum wage. I address this concern by
repeating the analysis using immigrants who have at least some college education.
These immigrants should, in general, command market wages above the minimum
wage, and thus the minimum wage should have a minimal effect on their expected
earnings. Figure 3.6 repeats Figure 3.2 for this group, displaying wage distributions
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before and after minimum wage increases. In contrast to the wage distributions of
low-skilled immigrants, these results do not reveal any spike at zero to suggest that
the minimum wage binds. The wage distribution does shift slightly to the right
in the range just about the new minimum, opening the possibility that wage in-
creases among lower-paid workers may result in some small spillover wage increases
for higher-paid workers. Nevertheless, if the results in Table 3.10 truly reflect im-
migrants responding to the labor market incentives created by the minimum wage,
the geographic distribution of higher educated immigrants should respond to a much
smaller degree. If instead the negative correlation for low-skilled immigrants re-
sults from changes in unobserved state attributes that affect all potential residents,
minimum wage increases will also be associated with outflows of higher skilled im-
migrants.
The analysis passes this specification check, as shown in Table 3.11. The point
estimates are all near -0.1 and are substantially smaller than the corresponding es-
timates in Table 3.10. None of the estimates can be statistically distinguished from
zero. Thus, the null that changes in the location pattern of higher-skilled immigrants
are unrelated to changes in the minimum wage cannot be rejected. Additionally, a
confidence interval using standard significance levels does not include the strong neg-
ative elasticity for the high school dropout immigrants. These results provide even
more support for interpreting that empirical relationship as evidence that low-skilled
immigrants are highly responsive to differences in labor market opportunities across
geography.
3.3.7 Newer Arrivals Are More Responsive
One remaining question is whether the geographic immigrant population shifts
occur primarily through a reshuffling of immigrants who are already in the United
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States or through changes in where the most recent arrivals initially settle. Immi-
grants who arrived more recently might have fewer ties to a particular community,
and thus may be more responsive to differences in labor market prospects between
destinations.
Table 3.12 addresses this question. I classify immigrants by the recency of their
arrival (greater or fewer than five years ago), and the observations in these regressions
are state-month-recency cells. The first column restricts the effect of the minimum
wage to be constant for both types of immigrants, and the estimated coefficient
is quite similar to the results using only one cell per state-month. The positive
coefficient on the uninteracted dummy for recency reflects the fact that in any given
month, there are more immigrants who arrived in the past five years than immigrants
who have been in the country between six and ten years.
This restricted model, however, masks considerable heterogeneity. The specifica-
tion in column 2 includes the interaction of the minimum wage variable with the
dummy variable for having arrived in the past five years. Recent arrivals are nearly
twice as responsive to changes in the minimum wage, although these results do show
some reshuffling of immigrants who had been in the country for longer periods of
time. This finding supports a similar result in Cadena (2008) that more recent ar-
rivals are more sensitive to changes in labor market prospects. The lower mobility
response for immigrants who have been in the country longer implies that the contin-
uous flow of new immigrants entering the country is an essential mechanism through
which the national labor market adjusts to geographically disparate shocks.
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3.4 Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper demonstrates that newly arriving immigrants serve as very elastic
marginal workers, willing to move across geography to access better labor market
prospects. Traditional models of local labor markets predict that such a mobile fac-
tor will tend to equalize the returns to factors across space. Although low-skilled
natives are quite immobile, this paper demonstrates that immigrants are much more
earnings-sensitive and geographically flexible. This result has a number of implica-
tions for policymakers and for future research.
First, state policymakers should realize that policies designed to affect their own
labor market will, through immigrants’ responses, affect other states as well. In the
particular case of the minimum wage, the flow of immigrants away from minimum
wage increases will lessen the negative employment consequences that would have re-
sulted within a closed system. Similarly, a program designed to increase employment
or raise wages is likely to attract more immigrants, potentially muting the benefit of
those programs to previous residents.
In addition, future research in several literatures needs to take account of this
result. As immigrants select labor markets that provide the highest returns, their
altered destination choices will tend to undermine the usefulness of geographic com-
parisons in determining the effect of labor market policies and shocks. As one exam-
ple, critics of a geographic approach to identifying the wage and employment effects
of increased low-skilled immigration allege that the type of selection demonstrated
in this paper undermines the usefulness of geographic comparisons. If immigrants
are close to perfect arbitrageurs, no comparison between areas receiving large immi-
grant inflows and those receiving smaller inflows will properly estimate the effect of
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increased immigration on the native wage structure, even if such an effect would be
substantial in the case of exogenous immigration and a closed labor market.
Finally, this paper suggests that the low mobility rates of low-skilled natives
will not necessarily lead to large wage differentials across geography. Endogenous
destination selection among immigrants can therefore prevent native workers from
bearing potentially higher relocation costs as negative shocks in one state will quickly
diffuse throughout the country. Future research should attempt to quantify this
often-overlooked benefit to immigration.
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Table 3.1: State Minimum Wage Policies 1994-2007
State









Alaska 100% 18% 3
Alabama 0% n/a 3
Arkansas 9% 15% 3
Arizona 14% 24% 3
California 74% 21% 7
Colorado 7% 23% 3
Connecticut 100% 17% 10
DC 100% 20% 4
Delaware 70% 15% 7
Florida 19% 19% 4
Georgia 0% n/a 3
Hawaii 100% 14% 4
Iowa 5% 11% 3
Idaho 0% n/a 3
Illinois 29% 20% 5
Indiana 0% n/a 3
Kansas 0% n/a 3
Kentucky 0% n/a 3
Louisiana 0% n/a 3
Massachussets 79% 21% 5
Maryland 13% 15% 3
Maine 43% 20% 8
Michigan 9% 27% 4
Minnesota 17% 16% 3
Missouri 14% 22% 4
Mississippi 0% n/a 3
Montana 7% 12% 3
North Carolina 7% 12% 3
North Dakota 0% n/a 3
Nebraska 0% n/a 3
New Hampshire 2% 11% 4
New Jersey 42% 18% 3
New Mexico 0% n/a 3
Nevada 8% 13% 3
New York 21% 23% 5
Ohio 7% 23% 3
Oklahoma 0% n/a 3
Oregon 98% 23% 8
Pennsylvania 7% 21% 4
Rhode Island 85% 17% 7
South Carolina 0% n/a 3
South Dakota 0% n/a 3
Tennessee 0% n/a 3
Texas 0% n/a 3
Utah 0% n/a 3
Virginia 0% n/a 3
Vermont 87% 18% 10
Washington 90% 24% 11
Wisconsin 18% 16% 4
West Virgina 11% 13% 4





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.6.1 Proof of Proposition III.1
To prove: When total labor supply is fixed and no workers migrate between
states the following inequality implies that expected earnings will increase in the








Proof. As shown in the text, the derivative of expected earnings depends on the
initial probability of finding employment, the initial wage, and the derivative of the
probability at the initial wage.
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3.6.2 Higher Turnover Implies Smaller Probability Effects
Here I formally demonstrate that labor markets with higher turnover rates expe-
rience smaller declines in the probability that a searching worker finds employment




Proof. Equation 3.12 gives the first derivative of the employment probability with












The denominator is always positive. The sign thus depends on the sign of the




< δ2(Em + Um)
∂Em
∂w
(δEm + Um). (3.19)
Dividing both sides by ∂E
m
∂w
(δEm + Um), which is negative, yields
δEm + Um > δ2Em + δ2Um. (3.20)
This inequality holds by inspection for all values of δ < 1.
CHAPTER IV
Can Self-Control Explain Avoiding Free Money?
Evidence from Interest-Free Student Loans
“Although it may be tempting to use student loan money for college foot-
ball tickets, midnight pizza while cramming for finals, or a Florida spring
break trip, try to resist this lure....If you receive a larger loan than you
need, the temptation to spend the extra money on “fun” things can be
hard or even impossible to resist.”
-Dara Duguay, “Spend Student Loans Only on College Expenses” youngmoney.com
(money management website for young adults), 2003
4.1 Introduction
This paper uses insights from behavioral economics to explain a particularly
bizarre borrowing phenomenon: About one in six undergraduate students who are
offered interest-free loans turn them down. The students we observe making these
choices are not atypical: Our sample consists of full-time students enrolled at pub-
lic or private non-profit four-year institutions who demonstrated sufficient financial
need to qualify for aid sponsored by the federal government.
There are three principal reasons we should be surprised that one-sixth of eligible
students turn down subsidized loans. First, these loans do not accrue interest until
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six months after students leave school. These interest payments represent a direct
transfer to the student, and the amount is non-trivial. If a student were to borrow the
maximum each year, with an interest rate of four percent, the government subsidy
would be worth more than $1500. The “free money” aspect of below-market interest
rates on student loans has long been a part of conventional economic wisdom. One
classic undergraduate textbook explains the benefits of a $1000 interest-free loan as
follows: “You could at least take the money and put it in a savings bank, where you
will earn at least 4 percent per year. Each year you can draw out the $40 interest and
throw a big party. Finally...you can draw out the $1,000, plus the last year’s interest;
repay the $1,000; and have $40 for a last party” (Alchian and Allen 1964). We are
unaware, however, of any work that has tried to systematically understand why
students do not take advantage of this potential $1500 “gift” from the government.1
Seeing students turn down interest-free loans is also surprising because government-
sponsored loans help to make increasingly expensive educational costs more afford-
able. During a period when the return to higher education has dramatically in-
creased, the rising costs of an undergraduate education have far outpaced the in-
crease in the availability of grants and scholarships (Hoxby and Long 1999, Dynarski
2002, Avery and Hoxby 2003). In 1980, 41 percent of financial aid was provided
through loans. Today, loans make up 59 percent of federal aid (Douthat 2005) and
45 percent of full-time students borrow to finance their education (National Center
for Educational Statistics 2000, National Center for Educational Statistics 2002).
In the absence of these programs, students would find it costly to borrow against
their future earnings due to informational asymmetries between students and private
lenders. The federal government has recognized this potential market failure and of-
1Note that a student need not plan on “gaming the system” when she borrows for accepting the loan to be a
good idea. If there is some uncertainty about the costs she will face over the school year, she may wish to borrow
the money as a precautionary measure.
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fers students grants and loans through large-scale programs which provided 90 billion
dollars in total aid during the 2004-2005 school year (The College Board 2005).2 By
rejecting their government-sponsored loans, students are effectively choosing to bor-
row at a significantly higher cost, if at all.
Finally, student aid offers are administered under the presumption that students
will accept all of their need-based aid. Students must actively reduce or reject any
amount they do not wish to borrow. In fact, if a student has borrowed before, she
needs to do nothing at all to receive the full amount of any subsidized loan awarded
by her financial aid office. As other researchers have shown, there is a significant
mental barrier to making decisions which deviate from the default, known as “default
bias” (c.f. Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick 2004). In the absence of competing
forces, therefore, students should rarely deviate from the default of accepting all of
their need-based aid, including interest-free loans.
While the benefits of subsidized student loans are seemingly unambiguous, bor-
rowing does increase a student’s short-term liquidity. As the quotation at the be-
ginning of this section suggests, interest-free loans are a double-edged sword in the
hands of an easily tempted consumer. Despite the fact that these loans make it
possible to smooth consumption over time, having such a large amount of liquidity
can lead to overspending, i.e. consuming more out of current income than an agent
with perfect willpower would desire.
We formalize this argument by modeling a college student choosing how much
to borrow for her education. We show that a rational agent would not turn down
2Previous work on the changing nature of the financial aid system focuses on the characteristics of students who
default on their loans (Knapp and Seaks 1992, Dynarski 1994). Other authors examine whether the size and type of
student loans affect whether and where students enroll (McPherson and Schapiro 1991, van der Klaauw 2002, Kane
2003, Epple, Romano and Sieg 2003). Field (2004) investigates an NYU law school experiment and finds that the
decision to enter public-interest law in exchange for a lower debt burden is sensitive to the timing of incurring debt.
See also Orfield (1992) for a summary of the policy debate which led to the expansion of student loans in the 1990s.
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interest-free student loans because doing so requires foregoing a significant govern-
ment subsidy in addition to limiting future liquidity. We then discuss how rejecting
the loan is consistent with models of self-control from the theoretical literature that
allow rational consumers to prefer a subset of choices to the complete set. The
debt-averse behavior we observe, therefore, may be the optimal choice a forward-
thinking student can make knowing that in the following period she will be tempted
to overspend.
There are, however, alternative reasons why a potential borrower could make the
“wrong” decision. Certainly some students will reject the loan because they do not
understand how the subsidy works or do not analyze the decision closely enough.3
Students may also falsely believe that borrowing through student loan programs will
hurt their credit score. In fact, each month while the student is in school the lender
reports that the loan account is being paid as agreed, establishing a solid credit
history. Apart from these information problems, some students may reject their
loans because of the hassle borrowing creates, such as having to keep track of the
documents associated with a loan or being required to make a payment each month
after graduation.4 Still others may reject the loans because they have acquired an
anti-debt ethic such that indebtedness carries a psychological cost. Survey research
in the United Kingdom finds that students who are uncomfortable with debt are
less likely to pursue a college education, although they do not attempt to determine
the source of this discomfort (Callender and Jackson 2005). Because any of these
factors can potentially explain the significant fraction of students who turn down
their interest-free loans, we cannot simply interpret high rejection rates as evidence
3See Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2006) for a discussion of the sometimes overwhelming complexity of the financial
aid system.
4Another potential reason to turn down student loans is that they are not dischargeable under current bankruptcy
law.
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of a self-control motive.
To determine whether self-control plays an important role, the ideal quasi-experimental
setting would fix the benefits of borrowing while varying students’ exposure to in-
creased liquidity. A feature of financial aid disbursement does exactly this: Although
the value of the subsidy is unchanged, needy on-campus students have their loans
automatically applied to their educational expenses while needy off-campus students
receive a portion of their aid in cash. Comparing the take-up rates of these two
groups provides us with a means to test whether self-control motives are responsible
for some of the failure in take-up.
However, if students who reject their loans for other reasons tend to live in off-
campus housing, this comparison may incorrectly attribute differences in take-up
rates to differences in liquidity. To address these selection concerns, we form a
difference-in-differences estimator, using students whose liquidity is unaffected by
their housing location as a counterfactual. For these students, any loan funds will
be applied directly to their tuition bill regardless of where they live. Importantly,
each member of the counterfactual group is also eligible for the maximum subsidized
loan. If students reject their loans to avoid excess liquidity, the difference between on-
and off-campus rejection rates should be much larger for the group who potentially
receive their loans in cash.
Our estimates from the 1999-2000 and 2003-2004 waves of the National Postsec-
ondary Student Aid Study support a self-control explanation: Students who would
have received cash from their loans turn down the subsidized loan seven percentage
points more frequently than similarly needy students who live on-campus. Impor-
tantly, there is no significant difference in rejection rates across housing locations for
students who would not receive cash regardless of where they live. As a further test,
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we estimate the effect of liquidity on take-up using the university’s dormitory capac-
ity (number of beds per student) as an instrument for the housing location decision.
The instrumental variables specification continues to show a differential willingness
to borrow across housing locations, even when controlling for differences in school
quality which are correlated with housing capacity. These results are difficult to
explain without self-control concerns affecting students’ decisions.
We provide evidence that consumers choose to limit their available choices in a
natural setting, i.e. one not generated by the researcher. While several laboratory
and simulation studies have presented evidence consistent with consumers exercising
self-control (Wertenbroch, Soman and Nunes 2001, Ariely and Wertenbroch 2002,
Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman 2003, Fernandez-Villaverde and Mukherji 2006),
studies using data and situations not generated by the researcher have tended to
find evidence of consumers succumbing to the temptation of earlier consumption
(Stephens 2003, Shapiro 2005, DellaVigna and Malmendier 2006). In addition, while
most field experiments are explicitly designed to hold constant any differences be-
tween two choices except for the level of commitment, our results reveal that some
consumers are willing to pay a substantial amount of money in order restrict their fu-
ture decisions.5 These two features distinguish this study as particularly compelling
evidence for the existence and importance of time-inconsistent preferences.
In the next section, we discuss the mechanics of financial aid and emphasize the
case when impatient individuals might be most wary of taking out loans. We present
a brief model of the financial aid process in Section 4.3 and show how rejecting
an interest-free loan, while costly, can effectively serve as a mechanism to regulate
impulsive consumption. In Section 4.4, we establish the phenomenon empirically,
5For example, Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2006) are careful to note the equal interest rates paid in the experimental
restricted bank account and the unrestricted account.
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test the additional predictions suggested by the model, and address selection into off-
campus housing. Section 4.5 concludes and discusses potential policy implications.
4.2 Overview of the Financial Aid Process
This section presents a sketch of the process that determines the financial aid
a college student receives. Our discussion draws heavily from the Federal Student
Aid Handbook published by the Department of Education for use by financial aid
professionals (Department of Education 2003).
There are two primary components that determine a student’s eligibility for all
federal financial aid: a measure of the student’s ability to pay, and the costs the
student faces at the school where she is enrolled. A student interested in need-based
financial aid must first file a Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA),
which collects information on the student and her parents, including the value of
their assets and incomes from the previous year.6 These data are then entered into a
federal formula that calculates the Expected Family Contribution (EFC), the dollar
amount a family could reasonably be expected to pay for the student’s educational
costs in the upcoming school year.
In order to qualify for need-based aid, a student must have educational expenses
in excess of her EFC.7 Based on this level of need, the student may be eligible
for grant money from the federal or state government or from the institution the
student attends. The student may also receive merit-based institutional aid or private
scholarships.
If these grants and scholarships do not cover the student’s entire need, she will be
6Individuals who have previously been convicted of drug-related felonies, or males over the age of 18 who refuse
to register for Selective Service, are generally not eligible for federal financial aid.
7The definition of educational expenses is quite broad and includes tuition and fees, room and board, books and
supplies, transportation, and other miscellaneous expenses.
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eligible for subsidized Stafford loans.8 The federal government pays the interest on
these loans as long as the student is enrolled at least half-time, and for a period of
six months after the student is no longer enrolled. Students can borrow through this
program up to a grade-level specific cap: $2,625 for first-year students, $3,500 for
second-year students and $5,500 for upper-year students. A student is thus eligible
for the maximum loan amount when the difference between her total costs and the
sum of the EFC and other grants is greater than the loan limit for her grade level.
After filing a FAFSA, the student receives an award letter from the college or
university she is attending (or from the schools to which she applied if she is a first-
time student). The letter contains an itemized list of the amounts and types of aid the
student has been awarded. Although students maintain the right to reject individual
types of aid and even to change individual amounts if they desire, the default choice
is to accept the amount of the interest-free loan awarded by the financial aid office.9
Thus students must intentionally choose not to receive subsidized loans for which
they are qualified.
Our identification relies on a feature of the loan disbursement process. Financial
aid funds must first be applied to expenses billed directly by the school, including
tuition and fees, dorm room rental, and cafeteria meal plans. Any aid funding
in excess of the school’s direct charges is then distributed to the student through
a refund check. Because aid eligibility is determined based on the entire student
budget and not just tuition, these refund checks are not uncommon.10
8Students with exceptional need are also given access to interest-free Perkins loans. The Perkins loan program
affects far fewer students than the Stafford program, and the loans are administered by each institution separately,
so we choose to focus our attention on the larger federal program. The student may also receive a work-study award
which is a promise from the government to pay a portion of the students wages if she obtains employment. Because
both of these awards are also need-based, we will be conservative in the empirical section by subtracting Perkins and
work-study awards from need before categorizing a student as eligible or ineligible for the Stafford program.
9In order to receive their loans, first-time borrowers must sign a Master Promissory Note and receive loan coun-
seling related to borrowing through student loans. A student can currently fulfill both of these requirements online.
In subsequent years, the student does not need to take any additional action beyond the normal FAFSA application
process to receive the entire amount of loan funds she has been offered.
10Recent statistics based on administrative data from our institution reveals that 36 percent of aid recipients were
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Figure 4.1 presents the combination of circumstances required to be eligible for a
refund check. Students living off-campus receive refund checks earmarked for room
and board whenever the sum of their financial aid funds exceeds the cost of tuition
and fees. All else equal, students who attend schools with lower tuition or who receive
larger grant awards are more likely to be eligible for refunds. On-campus students
will never have direct control over the money because it is automatically applied
to their educational expenses, including room and board. Thus, the disbursement
process creates variation in the short-term liquidity to which students are exposed,
even though the financial benefits of the loan are the same.
4.3 A Self-Control Motive?
With these institutional details in mind, we explore a stylized version of the deci-
sion facing an enrolled student who receives an aid award that includes a subsidized
Stafford loan. We begin by demonstrating that rejecting the loan cannot be the op-
timal decision for a student with stable, time-invariant preferences. We then discuss
models from the literature under which rejecting a Stafford loan, and thus foregoing
the government subsidy, can be utility improving if doing so serves as a constraint
on the behavior of an impatient future self.
Students’ borrowing and consumption decisions take place over three periods:
prior to attendance, during school, and post-graduation. In the initial period, the
student is offered a financial aid package, one component of which is a subsidized
loan in the amount of S̄. She decides whether to accept or reject the loan, and once
she has chosen, no future actor can alter this decision.11 We refer to the actor who
issued refund checks.
11We discuss the choice as binary, despite the fact that students can choose to borrow only a fraction of the
amount they are offered. While we were originally interested in students who took partial loans because they appear
to exhibit sophisticated behavior, data limitations do not allow us to distinguish between volitional partial borrowers
and students who failed to receive the full amount because they dropped out or graduated. In addition, the structure
of the award letter often frames the choice as an all-or-none decision, with the reduction option buried in the fine
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makes these decisions as the “Borrower.”
In the next period, during school, the student takes her previous loan-taking
decisions as given, receives financial aid and other exogenous income (e.g. parental
support), and pays tuition. We denote income available after paying tuition as I2.
The student then decides how much to consume while in school, c2, and how much
to save until the final period. Savings earn a (nominal) interest rate of r per period.
We assume that, other than her access to student loans, the student cannot access
alternative credit markets.12 We refer to the actor who makes these decisions as the
“Student.”
In the final period, post-graduation, the student receives income I3, repays the
principal on any loan she has accepted (the government pays the interest), and
consumes the remainder of her income. We refer to this actor as the “Graduate.”
The decision whether to borrow is equivalent to a choice between two in-school
budget sets, shown in Figure 4.2.13 If the Borrower chooses to reject the loan, the
Student will be faced with the budget set AB. Choosing to borrow provides the
Student with budget set CD. Notice that borrowing has two effects on the choice
set available to the Student. First, the loan relaxes the Student’s credit constraint,
allowing her to consume more than I2 while in school by borrowing against future
income, I3.
Additionally, the government pays the interest that would normally accrue on
the loan, rS̄. This increase in lifetime income results in a vertical shift upward in
the budget set. Proving that a rational student who is not subject to problems of
temptation and self-control should strictly prefer to accept the loan requires nothing
print.
12While allowing for students to borrow from higher-cost private lenders would add a degree of realism, the intuition
underlying this section would be unchanged. We maintain the assumption for expositional simplicity.
13For a more general discussion of how self-control concerns cause consumers to prefer a subset of choices to the
entire set, see (Gul and Pesendorfer 2001).
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more than an assumption of locally non-satiated preferences as the choice set avail-
able without borrowing is a proper subset of the choice set induced by accepting the
loan.
4.3.1 Behavioral motivations
For students who tend to indulge in immediate gratification, however, accepting
the loan may not be the optimal choice. In order to take advantage of the government
interest payment rS̄, the Borrower must relax a constraint on in-school consumption,
making it far easier for the Student to overspend.
Dating back to the pioneering work of Strotz (1955), consumer choice theory has
developed models which allow for restrictions of future choices to improve lifetime
utility. More recently, Laibson (1997), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) and Freder-
ick, Shane, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002) explore time-inconsistent prefer-
ences in which consumers consistently prefer immediate consumption, and discuss
the utility improvement that commitment devices can create. The economic the-
ory of self-control in which consumers use personal rules to regulate the impulses
of their current and future ”selves” began with Thaler and Shefrin (1981), and was
further developed by Loewenstein and co-authors (Loewenstein and Thaler 1989, Pr-
elec and Loewenstein 1998) and Benabou and Tirole (2004). In each of these models,
some consumers are willing to pay to restrict their future consumption because they
anticipate that doing so will help them avoid overspending.
The appendix contains a more formal treatment of one of these potential mech-
anisms, using quasi-hyperbolic discounting to create a time inconsistency in prefer-
ences. Here we highlight the main insights of that analysis. When the Student is
relatively patient, it is not worth discarding the government subsidy to change her
consumption behavior. The Borrower allows the Student access to the loan funds
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even though she knows the Student will consume more than she would like her to.
For a sufficiently impatient future actor, however, rejecting the loan can be utility
improving.
Access to an additional commitment device that would lessen the temptation
caused by the increased liquidity could mediate an agent’s desire to reject a loan
for self-control reasons. For example, as mentioned in the previous section, students
who live on-campus will have their loan funds applied directly to their educational
expenses. This aspect of the distribution process reduces the Student’s short-term
liquidity and guarantees that loan funds will be spent on “Borrower-approved” ex-
penses. Either or both of these features may help the borrower control her consump-
tion impulses. In contrast, Students who receive refund checks must manage these
funds over the course of the semester, facing the constant lure to spend more out of
a temporarily high bank account balance. Because of this increased temptation, we
expect students eligible for refund checks to reject their loans more often than their
on-campus counterparts.
Thus far we have argued that rejecting an interest-free loan can serve as an effec-
tive, albeit costly, method of reining in one’s self-control problem and that students
who would receive refund checks should be especially likely to make use of this mech-
anism. An important remaining concern is whether students will or should choose
this method over a less-costly alternative. For concreteness, we consider the option
of depositing the student loan funds into a certificate of deposit (CD).
There are several reasons to believe that such an alternative does not represent
a viable option for our study population. First, depositing the money into a CD
requires a significant amount of financial savvy that needy college students likely
lack. We argue that these students are “sophisticated” only in that they perceive
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their own personalities and habits, not that they understand the nuances of the
financial system as well as readers of this journal.14 Additionally, the penalties on
CD’s (often only a few months’ interest) are probably not large enough to deter
students from accessing these accounts for perceived “emergencies.” Finally, this
strategy is vulnerable to the exact problem it seeks to correct. Because the money
does not arrive until after school begins, the Borrower must rely upon the impatient
Student to deposit the money into the CD. For each of these reasons, rejecting the
loan represents the best choice for students aware of their own sufficiently severe
self-control problems.
While we have described the model in the context of a within-person princi-
pal/agent problem rather than as a parent/child problem, the latter problem would
have much the same flavor. In order to address concerns over parental influences, we
directly examine parental financial support data in the empirical section. Nonethe-
less, the primary result is that seemingly irrational aversion to debt can be a rational
response to a difference in the discount rates between the economic actor who makes
the borrowing decision and the actor who makes the consumption decision.
4.4 Empirical Results
4.4.1 Data
We use the 1999-2000 and the 2003-2004 cross-sectional waves of the National
Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS) to investigate the predictions of the
self-control model. This unique data source combines administrative financial aid
data from the school and from the National Student Loan Data System (NSLDS),
information submitted by students and parents on their aid applications, and survey
14According to the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, only 12.7% of all households held CD’s, with rates much
lower for moderate-income families who would likely qualify for financial aid.
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responses from the students during the school year.15 In addition, the NPSAS con-
tains detailed institution characteristics and individual student information, such as
GPA, SAT scores, school location and selectivity, and demographic characteristics.16
To focus our analysis on the individuals toward whom the financial aid system is
most directly targeted, we restrict our sample to full-time, full-year undergraduate
students enrolled at one four-year public or private non-profit institution for a full
academic year. The sample includes only those students who applied for financial aid
and whose unmet need exceeded the subsidized loan maximum.17 Therefore, within
a grade level, all students are eligible for the same interest-free loan amount.18 These
students are usually those considered “representative” needy college students, and
those most likely to be burdened with loans upon completion of college.
The fact that about one-sixth of our sample of needy students does not accept
interest-free loans is striking. Table 4.1 provides a descriptive look at the data, em-
phasizing that a significant fraction of students in each demographic group do not
take the loan.19 The most dramatic differences in take-up rates are by race, where
Hispanic and Asian students are nearly twice as likely to turn down the loan as
15One additional advantage of the NPSAS is that students make their financial aid decisions prior to being selected
into the survey. Thus, there is no additional pressure to make the “correct” decision as a result of being in the study.
16We use the restricted version of the data for our analysis. A confidential data license agreement with NCES is
required in order to obtain these data.
17This selection criterion introduces some heterogeneity by admitting needy students as well as more financially
able students at high cost schools. To mitigate this issue, we further restrict our sample to students who, if they
accepted their student loan, would owe no more than an additional $10,000 in tuition. In addition, due to concerns
regarding the quality of some responses in the NPSAS, we restrict our dataset further to exclude individuals whose
values of student budget and Stafford loan amount were imputed. For similar accuracy concerns with the same
variables, we also excluded individuals who were independent or lived with their parents, and students who were not
born in the United States. Without these restrictions we risk making significant classification errors.
18Note that this sampling frame requires greater unmet need for upperclassmen to be included in the sample than
for freshmen and sophomores. We have rerun our analysis using only students who have $5,500 in unmet need
regardless of grade level, and the results are qualitatively unchanged.
19We refer to students who applied for financial aid and who were determined to be eligible for subsidized loans
according to the federal formula but who do not receive any loan funds as having rejected the loan. Because this
measure is all that our data allow, we were concerned that a significant fraction of our observed rejections might be
the result of measurement error where we had incorrectly classified a student as eligible. We asked a senior financial
aid administrator at our own institution whether this number agreed with administrative data. She informed us that
18 percent of Stafford borrowers actively turned down their subsidized loans by logging on to the financial aid system
and canceling the loans. Another significant fraction “passively” rejected the loans by failing to return the necessary
paperwork for disbursal. This communication suggests that measurement error in eligibility does not comprise a
large component of this descriptive statistic. Because we cannot distinguish between active and passive rejection in
the data, we refer to all students who applied for aid and who qualified for loans but did not receive the loan as
having turned it down.
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white and African-American students. This could be due to persistent differences in
distaste for debt by culture, differences in self-control, information, or other factors.
These results serve as a reminder that while self-control may be an important deter-
minant of the borrowing decision, it is certainly not the only one. Racial differences
in loan rejection are not the emphasis of this paper, though we investigate these
racial gaps in more detail below.
Students with high unmet need are much more likely to take the loan. This
difference confirms that, on average, the loans are being used by those who need
them most. Students from families that earn less than $50,000, roughly the median
in our sample, are actually more likely to turn down the loan than are students from
wealthier families. Recall, however, that these families are also likely to be eligible for
larger grant awards and scholarships. Because family income and need are negatively
related as a result of the federal aid formula, it is difficult to determine whether
either factor independently drives this result. More generally, this table reveals that
students of all types reject the interest-free loans at non-trivial rates.
4.4.2 Evidence for a Self-Control Explanation
Less than full participation in the interest-free loan program is consistent with a
number of hypotheses, including taste-based debt aversion, non-pecuniary “hassle”
costs of borrowing, or a lack of information. The self-control discussion presented
in section 4.3 provides a behavioral reason for rejecting subsidized loans. Unlike
the other candidate explanations, this potential motivation provides an additional
testable hypothesis: Students should be particularly unwilling to accept their loans
when doing so would lead to a larger increase in short-term liquidity.
Recall from Figure 4.1 that some students living off-campus will receive financial
aid funds earmarked for room and board in cash which they must manage over the
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course of the semester, while others have funds applied directly to their educational
expenses. If students turn down loans solely because they dislike debt or because
they do not understand the benefits, the form in which the loan funds are disbursed
should make no difference. In contrast, if self-control is an important factor in
students’ take-up decisions, they should be especially reluctant to accept the loans
if doing so results in a refund check.
One approach would be to compare take-up rates between on-campus and off-
campus students whose loan funds would pay for room and board. The results of
this type of analysis are shown in the first column of Table 4.2. Students who live
off-campus are 8.0 percentage points less likely to accept their loans than are students
in the same financial situation living on campus. We are concerned, however, that
living off-campus may be associated with greater loan rejection for reasons other than
the “refund check” effect. To address this issue, we create a counterfactual using
the difference in take-up rates between on-campus and off-campus students whose
financial aid benefits, including subsidized loans, do not exceed tuition. Students in
the counterfactual sample are also eligible for the maximum subsidized loan amount
(see Figure 4.1). Assuming that any omitted factors affecting both housing choice
and take-up are similarly distributed across these two financial aid situations, this
specification controls for differences in take-up not related to the “refund check”
effect.
The results of this difference-in-differences specification are presented in the sec-
ond column of Table 4.2. We estimate linear probability models of the form
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yi =α1(OFFCAMPUS)i + α2(ROOMBOARD)i
+ α3(OFFCAMPUS ∗ROOMBOARD)i +Xiβ + νi.
The dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether a student accepted his/her
interest-free loan (1=accept). The independent variables are indicators for residence
(1=off-campus) and for whether loan funds, if accepted, would pay for room and
board (1=yes).20 The interaction of these two variables creates an indicator for
whether the loans are distributed in cash (1=refund check). The coefficient on this
variable, α3, is our primary parameter of interest and our measure of the effect of a
potential increase in liquidity on loan take-up.21
After netting out any on/off-campus differences unrelated to increased liquid-
ity, the resulting coefficient remains strongly negative at 7.3 percentage points (col-
umn 2). Figure 4.3 presents an important specification check for the difference-in-
differences methodology. The graph plots loan acceptance rates against the amount
of aid in excess of tuition (including the loan). The continuous lines represent the re-
sults of local linear regression smoothing, while the individual points give unweighted
averages of bins with a $1000 half-width. The darker lines and points represent the
off-campus sample; the lighter plots represent the on-campus sample. For students
whose loans pay only tuition (to the left of zero), the relationship between aid and
acceptance is quite similar across housing situations. However, for students whose
loans would pay for room and board, the on and off-campus acceptance rates quickly
diverge as the amount of excess aid increases. These differential trends following the
20We limit the sample to students who live either in on-campus housing or off-campus, but not with their parents.
Students who live with their parents are typically given a much smaller housing allowance than students living
off-campus independently, and thus it is more difficult to determine their eligibility.
21We have run linear probability models because our primary parameter of interest is the interaction term, which
can be difficult to interpret in probit and other MLE models. Most of the variables we include are categorical, and,
as a result, none of the predicted values are greater than one or below zero.
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cutoff arise even though the local linear regression does not impose any structure on
the shape of the estimated relationship.
This result supports the hypothesis that off-campus students are differentially
rejecting the loans to avoid receiving large easy-to-spend refund checks. Additionally,
the relatively small change in slope at zero aid for on-campus students supports using
this group as a counterfactual for off-campus students’ acceptance rates were they to
live on-campus. Figure 4.3 demonstrates that most of the divergence in acceptance
rates occurs quickly after the zero-dollar cutoff. Consequently, we continue to report
categorical difference-in-differences results rather than results that include the size
of the potential refund as a continuous variable.
Adding controls for race, gender and year in school (and thus indirectly for the
amount of loan eligibility) in column 3 of Table 4.2 reduces this “refund check” effect
only slightly, by less than one half of one percentage point. Importantly, we find little
empirical evidence to support a selection across housing options argument as there is
no significant difference in take-up between locations for those students whose loans
pay only tuition.
These results provide strong evidence that liquidity concerns play a role in de-
termining loan take-up decisions. There are certainly other factors affecting the
borrowing choice. In particular, students with a smaller immediate need for funding
(accepted loan funds cover more than tuition) are 6.5 percentage points less likely to
accept the loan. Nonetheless, students with similar funding needs are an additional
7.0 percentage points less likely to take the loans when they would receive cash.
While we have described the student’s self-control dilemma in the context of a
within-person principal/agent framework rather than as a parent/child problem, the
latter problem would have much the same flavor. To address parental influences, we
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include indicators for whether parents help pay tuition or other financial support,
which includes housing expenses, in column 4, our preferred specification. While
students whose parents help pay tuition are less likely to take the loan, the “refund
check” result remains even after including measures of parental assistance. All else
equal, students who would be exposed to additional short-term liquidity are 7.1
percentage points less likely to take the loan.
Table 4.3 presents a series of additional robustness checks on our main result. One
alternative explanation for these results is that housing decisions and neediness are
serving as proxies for other characteristics of the school the student attends. The
NPSAS provides a broad range of school-level characteristics, which we add to our
preferred specification from Table 4.2. The results are largely unchanged; the point
estimate on the “refund check” effect falls by only 0.5 percentage points and remains
significant at the five percent level.
The second column of this table addresses the question of whether the “loan funds
in cash” effect can best be interpreted as evidence for a self-control or a parental con-
trol explanation. We exclude school attributes but include a full battery of parental
assistance measures and parental characteristics. The additional parental assistance
measures are insignificant, and whether at least one parent has some college expe-
rience is insignificant as well. That our result still holds suggests that self-control
concerns are independent of the role of parents, though a student’s parents may still
influence her take-up decision. As a further test, we estimated our preferred speci-
fication separately on the sample of students who received parental assistance, and
then using only those who did not, and generated nearly identical results.22
The third column of Table 4.3 presents the most demanding test of the data,
22We have also estimated similar specifications including a cubic in parental income, which does not substantively
affect the point estimate. All results not reported in the tables are available from the authors upon request.
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adding college-specific fixed effects. The point estimate of the coefficient of interest
remains negative, but is no longer statistically different from zero (p = 0.12), nor
statistically different from the results of previous columns. This specification uses
only within-school variation in the housing locations and financial situations of stu-
dents and has the potential to remove unobserved institutional characteristics that
affect loan take-up decisions. However, this specification also ignores the potential
endogeneity of the decision to live on or off campus. If, for example, students with
self-control problems choose to live on campus to ensure that aid funds go toward
appropriate expenses, this selection will tend to minimize differences in on and off
campus take-up rates, especially within schools. We address this possibility in detail
below. Nonetheless, even when controlling for a multitude of possibly confound-
ing factors, our results which use both between- and within-school variation remain
economically and statistically significant, and are consistent with a self-control ex-
planation.
There is an alternative economic story consistent with the results presented thus
far that does not require the existence of self-control problems. Because housing
charges are traditionally due at the beginning of a semester, on-campus students (or
their parents) may need to borrow more often than their off-campus counterparts in
order to pay this bill on time. In order to rule out this alternative explanation we
collected data on whether students’ schools offered an installment payment plan.23
We verified that 88 percent of our schools, representing 92 percent of our students,
provide access to a payment plan that allows students to spread their directly-billed
charges (including housing) over several installments. When we restrict our sam-
23To do so, we began with lists of participating institutions from two private firms that provide payment plans for
multiple schools. We conducted web searches to determine whether schools that did not contract with either of these
providers offered similar plans, and only used the 2003/04 NPSAS data, as payment plan options may have changed
since the 1999-2000 school year.
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ple to only those students with access to an installment plan, the coefficient on the
interaction term is -4.4 percentage points in our preferred specification, and is sig-
nificant at the 10 percent level (p < 0.09). This robustness check implies that the
“loan funds in cash” effect we are identifying is not due primarily to the immediate
liquidity needs of on-campus students at the start of each semester.
4.4.3 Selection on observables and unobservables
The stability of the point estimates when controlling for a host of potentially
confounding factors suggests that the distribution of these covariates is roughly equal
across the four housing location/financial situation categories. Table 4.4 investigates
this balance directly. Students from all demographic types can be found in each
category, usually in roughly the same proportions. Most of the demographic variation
across these categories can be attributed exclusively to housing location or to financial
situation, rather than to the “refund check” interaction. Additionally, the table
reveals that our comparison group (those whose loans pay only tuition) are only
somewhat better off than the group potentially eligible for a refund check. The
difference in Estimated Family Contribution is only about $4,500. Our comparison,
therefore, is not between poor and non-poor students, but rather between needy and
somewhat less needy students.
There are a few cases, however, where demographic variables differed systemati-
cally by refund check status. This imbalance presents a challenge to the difference-
in-differences specification. As an example, suppose that minority students are es-
pecially wary of borrowing to pay for expenses other than tuition. If more of these
students live off-campus than on-campus, then the measured interaction would be
negative even in the absence of any direct effect of receiving the loan in cash. An
analogous argument can be made for any of the other unbalanced covariates.
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To address this alternative explanation, we report a series of additional regressions
that include the interaction of unbalanced covariates with both the off-campus and
“loan pays room and board” dummies. The results are presented in four appendix
tables. Appendix Table 1 includes interactions with students’ race and gender. Point
estimates for the refund check coefficient range from -5.5 percentage points to -7.1
percentage points, and each is statistically significant at the .05 level. The second
appendix table focuses on grade level. Here the coefficients of interest range from
-7.1 percentage points to -8.7 percentage points and all estimates are significant at
the 0.01 level.
The final two tables focus on whether differential characteristics of the schools
the students attend across the four categories can explain the liquidity effect we
identify. Appendix Table 3 interacts the two determinants of refund check status
with the type of school, while the final table interacts these variables with measures
of cost. In the third table, the interaction ranges from -6.9 percentage points to -7.9
percentage points. Each is significant at the 0.01 level. In the final table, the point
estimate falls slightly, and we lose some precision, but the refund check effect is still
significant at the .10 level. By helping to rule out simple composition effects, these
robustness checks provide further evidence that variation in take-up across these
groups is driven by exposure to different levels of short-term liquidity.
Nevertheless, it is still possible that differential selection into off-campus housing
based on omitted factors drives the difference-in-differences results. To address this
concern, we estimate instrumental variables (IV) regressions using the fraction of
undergraduates that the student’s school could place in on-campus housing as an
instrument for living off-campus.24
24These data do not appear in the NPSAS files. We obtained the data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education
Data System (IPEDS), http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/, and merged them into our dataset using the school identifiers.
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Beds per student, viewed as a supply restriction for on-campus housing, is an ex-
cellent candidate for use as an instrument. Students who attend schools with smaller
housing capacities are certainly more likely to live off-campus. Additionally, there
is little reason to think that a school’s housing capacity directly affects borrowing
decisions. Below, we investigate concerns that students’ enrollment decisions might
be affected by factors correlated with housing capacity such as school quality or
generosity.
Column 1 of Table 4.5 shows the results of the just-identified IV regressions, using
housing capacity as an instrument for on-campus housing, and housing capacity
interacted with whether the accepted loan funds pay for room and board as an
instrument for the “refund check” effect. Both instruments clearly meet the test
for relevance, with first-stage F-statistics over three hundred. These results suggest
that, if anything, endogenous selection into off-campus housing attenuates the OLS
estimates of the effect of receiving aid funds in cash.
To address concerns of instrument exogeneity, we re-estimated our IV specification
including measures of institutional quality and the size of the school’s endowment.
The specification presented in column 1 includes dummy variables for urbanicity
and Carnegie classification, and the results are largely unchanged when we use other
measures of school quality, such as the 25th or 75th percentile for incoming students’
SAT scores (column 2), or the institution’s graduation rate (column 3). Finally, a
potential concern about a university’s endowment, wherein a wealthier school might
both have more on-campus housing and provide more generous aid and scholarships,
would bias us against finding any “refund check” effect.25
While these checks on exogeneity are not exhaustive, these additional IV specifi-
25For a subset of our sample, we included a measure of the university’s endowment from the IPEDS data. The
school’s endowment is nearly uncorrelated with the institution’s housing capacity, and the IV results for this sub-
sample were unaffected.
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cations suggest that housing capacity affects loan take-up only through the decision
whether to live on or off campus. Taken together, the fully interacted difference-in-
difference and instrumental variables results in this section indicate that endogenous
selection into off-campus housing does not artificially generate differential take-up
rates by housing status.
4.4.4 Evidence of Planning Ahead
Thus far we have presented evidence that students who would receive a part of
their loan funding in cash are less likely to accept the loan. Viewed through the lens of
a self-control model, these empirical results support the hypothesis that students are
rejecting their loans as a commitment device against overspending. These results,
however, provide no direct evidence that students are rejecting their loans as an
optimal forward-looking strategy. Tables 4.6 and 4.7 present two separate tests to
determine whether students are indeed planning ahead to reject these loans.
When filing a FAFSA in the spring, aid applicants must report whether they
would like loans included in their financial aid package, as well as where they expect
to live in the fall. The residential choice and the preference for loans do not directly
determine the aid package offered to students in most cases.26 Table 4.6 provides fur-
ther evidence that the rejection of loans by potential refund recipients is intentional.
These regressions replicate columns 2 and 4 of Table 4.2, but use the student’s desire
for loans as a part of the aid package as the dependent variable. Students who would
get a refund are more likely to report that they are not interested in loans than are
other groups. Their desire to avoid borrowing reveals itself not only in their eventual
26Further correspondence with the financial aid administrator at our own institution confirmed this fact. The
primary concern among administrators is that students will respond that they are not interested in loans in an
attempt to secure more grant funding. As a result, subsidized loans are included in an aid package even if a
student has reported not being interested. In addition, subsidized loans are an entitlement program, as students
demonstrating eligibility cannot be denied these loans. Notably, in our sample more than half of the students who
reported not being interested in loans eventually borrowed their entire grade-level maximum.
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behavior but also in their stated intentions before making any borrowing decisions.
The first two columns of Table 4.7 replicate columns 2 and 4 of Table 4.2, again us-
ing whether the student accepts subsidized loans as the dependent variable, with the
sample restricted to students who correctly anticipated whether they would live on
or off campus. Our main result is even stronger and more significant when we restrict
our sample to these individuals. Columns 3 and 4 show that the coefficient of inter-
est for the sample who incorrectly predicted their housing location is approximately
zero. Thus, our findings are driven primarily by students who could have correctly
predicted whether they would receive a refund when making their borrowing deci-
sion. These results provide further support for the hypothesis that students’ failure
to receive interest-free loans is the result of the type of forward-thinking decisions
made by “sophisticated” consumers aware of their self-control problems.
4.5 Implications for policy and further research
Our analysis suggests that self-control motives play a significant role in students’
decisions to reject interest-free loans.27 Students choose not to borrow despite govern-
ment subsidies, and they are particularly less likely to borrow when doing so provides
them with a large amount of easy-to-spend cash. This behavior is consistent with the
optimal choices of sophisticated economic actors with self-control concerns.28 Other
theories can explain the descriptive results, but no competing theory predicts that
students will be exceptionally averse to borrowing when the funding is distributed
in cash. These empirical results provide some of the first non-laboratory evidence
of consumers choosing to limit their own borrowing and consumption despite the
27It is likely that we have identified only a portion of the behavior induced by self-control problems. Our estimates
omit any effect resulting from students choosing not to apply for aid at all to avoid being faced with the temptation
of loan funds.
28It is straightforward to show that students who do not anticipate their own impatience will also accept the entire
loan for the same reason the rational student does. That their impatience leads to overconsumption is a standard
result, and is also easily shown.
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financial costs. In doing so, these results also suggest that many types of behavior
previously thought to be “irrationally” debt-averse may, in fact, result from con-
sumers trying to constrain their own impulses.
These results also have important implications for policy decisions related to sub-
sidizing student borrowing. First, we find that a significant fraction of students who
reject their loans would have used the money for living expenses rather than for
tuition and fees. This finding suggests that the loans end up going to students who
actually use the money for school rather than to those who are gaming the system.
However, many needy students, particularly from minority populations, do not reap
the benefits of loans that our data suggest they would find unambiguously financially
beneficial.
A second policy consideration concerns the efficiency of the design of the current
loan system. Recent work on the optimal choice of default rules reveals that setting
the default far away from decision-makers’ true optima may be welfare improving
(Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick 2003). Accentuating the difference between
the optimum and the default can cause a greater fraction of decision-makers to reject
the default and choose their personal optimum. This consideration must be balanced
with a desire to set the default close to the modal optimum to minimize the total
costs of switching that agents must incur. In the case of subsidized loans, setting the
default to the maximum accomplishes both goals of optimal default rules by making
the default the mode decision and by maximizing the difference between the default
and the optimum for those who wish to deviate.
Third, potential policy solutions can directly reduce the burden of increased liq-
uidity and increase student participation in this need-based program. For example,
aid administrators could offer students access to educational spending accounts sim-
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ilar to flexible spending accounts currently used for medical expenses. Schools could
place any aid in excess of tuition into these accounts, and students would need to
provide evidence of approved education-related expenses in order to spend these
funds. Account balances would earn interest. Upon leaving school, any remaining
funds could be applied directly to the student’s outstanding loan balances. In this
way, all students could receive the benefits of the subsidized loans without needing
to manage large increases in liquidity.29
The results presented in this paper are some of the first evidence that individuals
are willing to pay to restrict their choices in a non-experimental setting, and suggest
several avenues of additional research. While our data support an explanation for the
surprisingly low take-up of interest-free student loans based on temptation and self-
control, further survey work or a randomized experiment could directly confirm this
channel. The shift from grant-based aid to loan-based aid may also affect educational
decisions more broadly by influencing enrollment and school choice, and the extent
of these effects is certainly worthy of further consideration.
Finally, by interacting hyperbolic discounting models with the particular features
of this credit market, we have shown that impatience and a need for self-control can
induce debt-averse behavior. Although the “rational” choice is less clearly defined in
other contexts, we expect that this insight could help explain unresolved questions in
similar economic situations, such as repaying car loans or home mortgages ahead of
schedule. Further research is needed to determine how important a role self-control
plays in other credit markets.
29Alternatively, financial aid offices could offer the “excess” aid in monthly installments. When we compared
schools on the semester calendar (where students receive two checks each year) to schools on the quarter calendar,
we found that our results were stronger (though not significantly so) when the checks were delivered less frequently.
To our knowledge, no university currently offers either educational spending accounts or monthly aid checks.
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4.6 Figures and Tables
Figure 4.1: Student circumstances and refund eligibility
Off-campus
Do not pay room     
and board Pay room and board
Accepted loan funds:
Eligible for refund 
checkNot eligible
Housing location:
On-campus Not eligible Not eligible
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u(I2 + S̄) + δu(I3 − S̄)
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Subsidized Stafford Loan Take-up
% Reject loan N
















Parents do not pay tuition 16.6% 2309
Parents pay tuition 17.4% 2662
Parental income
Below $50,000/year 18.5% 3385
Above $50,000/year 14.3% 2146
Cost of attendance after grants/scholarships
Below median 20.1% 3095
Above median 12.7% 2436
Parental education
HS degree or less 17.0% 1516
Some college or higher 16.6% 3863
Standardized test scores
Below median SAT / ACT 14.6% 982




Source:  Authors' calculations using the NPSAS 99/00 and 03/04.
Note: We restrict the sample to full-year, full-time, US-born, 
dependent, undergraduate students at four-year public or private non-
profit institutions who do not live with their parents, applied for 
financial aid, and demonstrated financial need exceeding their grade-
level specific loan maximum.  We additionally exclude students 
whose values of student budget and Stafford loan amount are 
imputed.
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Table 4.2: Linear Probability Models for Subsidized Stafford Take-up Rates by Direct Access
Dependent variable:  Eligiblea
Accept/reject interest-free loans (1) (2) (3) (4)
Loan funds distributed in cash (offcampus*room and board)b -0.080** -0.073** -0.070** -0.071**
(0.017) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Lives off-campus, not with parents -0.004 -0.005 -0.011
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016)










Other race 0.027 0.028
(0.026) (0.027)
Parents help pay tuition -0.043**
(0.012)
Financial support other than tuition 0.009
(0.012)
Constant 0.840** 0.888** 0.888** 0.907**
(0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014)
Controls for grade level (4 categories) No No Yes Yes
Observations 2771 5531 5531 5531
R2 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
All models include a dummy for survey year.
b. Loan funds are distributed in cash when the student BOTH lives off-campus and accepted loan funds pay 
room and board.  See Figure 1.
Full Sample
a. The sample for the first column includes only students who would receive a refund check if they lived off-
campus and accepted their loans.   We maintain the sample restrictions from Table 1.    
Source:  Authors' calculations using the NPSAS 99/00 and 03/04.
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Table 4.3: Subsidized Stafford Take-up Rates by Direct Access - Robustness Checks
Dependent variable:  
Accept/reject interest-free loans (1) (2) (3)
Loan funds distributed in cash (offcampus*room and board)a -0.066** -0.073** -0.038
(0.022) (0.023) (0.025)
Lives off-campus, not with parents -0.000 -0.010 0.020
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018)
Accepted loan funds pay room and board -0.065** -0.073** -0.044**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
Constant 0.934** 0.914** 0.863**
(0.035) (0.016) (0.019)
Controls for grade level (4 categories) Yes Yes Yes
Controls for race, gender, and parental assistance Yes Yes Yes
Controls for Carnegie Classification, urbanicityb Yes No No
Additional parental controlsc No Yes No
Institution-level fixed effects No No Yes
Observations 5499 5379 5531
R2 0.04 0.04 0.24
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%.  All models include a dummy for survey year.
Source:  Authors' calculations using the NPSAS 99/00 and 03/04.
c. Parents' education, whether parents help pay educational expenses, whether parents pay non-
housing living expenses.
b. Includes 3 selectivity dummies, 5 categories of Carnegie classification, and 7 categories for 
degree of urbanicity.
a. Loan funds are distributed in cash when the student BOTH lives off-campus and accepted 
loan funds pay room and board.  See Figure 1.  We maintain the sample restrictions from Table 
1.  
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Table 4.4: Balance of Control Variables
On-campus/off-campus? On On Off Off
Does loan cover some room&board expenses? No Yes No Yes
Borrower gets a refund check?a No No No Yes
Female 55.0% 56.8% 56.3% 58.4%
African-American 12.0% 22.7% 8.9% 12.1%
Hispanic 4.8% 7.4% 6.3% 13.0%
Asian-American 2.5% 3.7% 3.6% 3.7%
Other race 2.9% 3.6% 2.8% 3.3%
Masters U. 20.5% 22.4% 18.9% 17.8%
BA U. 20.0% 13.7% 7.6% 4.6%
Oth U. 40.3% 39.7% 55.3% 50.1%
Research U. 19.2% 24.2% 17.6% 27.2%
Highly selective 24.7% 21.1% 23.5% 19.2%
Moderately selective 71.4% 74.2% 68.5% 75.5%
Not selective 4.0% 4.7% 8.1% 5.3%
High parental education 77.5% 67.2% 71.6% 67.8%
Tuition above median 69.8% 36.4% 61.7% 11.3%
Any parental help with expenses 76.7% 67.2% 62.3% 52.8%
After grant cost of attendance above median 75.2% 10.1% 81.1% 14.4%
Parental income above median 58.6% 19.4% 55.6% 20.3%
Test scores above median 52.9% 49.1% 51.9% 48.4%
Demonstrated need above median 62.4% 28.9% 67.1% 31.6%
Has a credit card 44.2% 44.3% 56.6% 59.3%
Carries credit card balance 21.7% 26.6% 43.4% 42.6%
Average year in school 1.85 1.91 2.75 2.75
Expected Family Contribution (EFC) ($) 5,790     1,976     5,702     2,310     
Number of Observations 2152 1755 608 1016
Source:  Authors' calculations using the NPSAS 99/00 and 03/04.
Average year in school is coded as 1= Freshman, 2=Sophomore, etc.
a. Loan funds are distributed in cash when the student BOTH lives off-campus and 
accepted loan funds pay room and board.  See Figure 1.  We maintain the sample 
restrictions from Table 1. 
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Table 4.5: Instrumental Variable Estimates of the Liquidity Effect
(1) (2) (3)
Loan funds distributed in cash (offcampus*room and board)a -0.171* -0.181+ -0.186*
(0.079) (0.094) (0.093)
Lives off-campus, not with parentsb -0.039 -0.096 -0.046
(0.065) (0.083) (0.086)
Accepted loan funds pay room and board -0.016 -0.013 -0.010
(0.023) (0.026) (0.026)
Female 0.007 -0.000 -0.001
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
African American 0.004 -0.015 -0.009
(0.014) (0.017) (0.017)
Asian American -0.107** -0.101** -0.104**
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Hispanic -0.054* -0.055* -0.057*
(0.023) (0.025) (0.024)
Other Race 0.026 0.028 0.029
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
25th percentile for students' SAT/ACT scores -0.001 -0.007
(0.004) (0.005)




First-stage F-test for Instrument Relevance - Off Campus 374.1 228.8 195.0
First-stage F-test for Instrument Relevance - Loan in cash 296.5 216.6 209.3
Observations 5485 4997 4996
Source:  Authors calculations using the NPSAS 99/00 and 03/04, and data from 
http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/. 
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%.  Regressions also include an indicator for year of survey, and controls for 
urbanicity, Carnegie classification, and grade level listed in Table 3.
a. Loan funds are distributed in cash when the student BOTH lives off-campus and accepted loan 
funds pay room and board.  Whether loan funds are distributed in cash is instrumented by the 
interaction of accepted loan funds paying for room and board and dorm capacity.  See Figure 1.  
We maintain the sample restrictions from Table 1. 
b. Whether student lives on campus is instrumented by dormitory capacity.
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Table 4.6: Linear Probability Models of Stated Desire for Loans
On-campus/off-campus? On On Off Off
Does loan cover some room&board expenses? No Yes No Yes
Borrower gets a refund check?a No No No Yes
Female 55.0% 56.8% 56.3% 58.4%
African-American 12.0% 22.7% 8.9% 12.1%
Hispanic 4.8% 7.4% 6.3% 13.0%
Asian-American 2.5% 3.7% 3.6% 3.7%
Other race 2.9% 3.6% 2.8% 3.3%
Masters U. 20.5% 22.4% 18.9% 17.8%
BA U. 20.0% 13.7% 7.6% 4.6%
Oth U. 40.3% 39.7% 55.3% 50.1%
Research U. 19.2% 24.2% 17.6% 27.2%
Highly selective 24.7% 21.1% 23.5% 19.2%
Moderately selective 71.4% 74.2% 68.5% 75.5%
Not selective 4.0% 4.7% 8.1% 5.3%
High parental education 77.5% 67.2% 71.6% 67.8%
Tuition above median 69.8% 36.4% 61.7% 11.3%
Any parental help with expenses 76.7% 67.2% 62.3% 52.8%
After grant cost of attendance above median 75.2% 10.1% 81.1% 14.4%
Parental income above median 58.6% 19.4% 55.6% 20.3%
Test scores above median 52.9% 49.1% 51.9% 48.4%
Demonstrated need above median 62.4% 28.9% 67.1% 31.6%
Has a credit card 44.2% 44.3% 56.6% 59.3%
Carries credit card balance 21.7% 26.6% 43.4% 42.6%
Average year in school 1.85 1.91 2.75 2.75
Expected Family Contribution (EFC) ($) 5,790     1,976     5,702     2,310     
Number of Observations 2152 1755 608 1016
Source:  Authors' calculations using the NPSAS 99/00 and 03/04.
Average year in school is coded as 1= Freshman, 2=Sophomore, etc.
a. Loan funds are distributed in cash when the student BOTH lives off-campus and 
accepted loan funds pay room and board.  See Figure 1.  We maintain the sample 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.7 Appendix - Formal Treatment Using Hyperbolic Discounting
This appendix considers the borrowing decision whether to accept or reject a
subsidized loan in the context of a student with quasi-hyperbolic preferences. In
particular, we assume that the Student has βδ preferences, i.e. her discount rate
between any two future periods, s and t is δt−s, while her discount rate between
consumption today (s = 0) and consumption in a future period t is βδt. Both β and
δ are smaller than unity.
In deciding whether to accept or reject the loan, the Borrower knows that the





c2 ≤ I2 + S (4.1)
c2(1 + r) + c3 = I2(1 + r) + I3 + rS (4.2)
The loan amount, S, is set by the Borrower as either S̄ (accept), or zero (reject), in
period 1, prior to the Student’s consumption decision. Consumption in each period,
ct, can take on any positive value, and It denotes income in period t.
We begin with a helpful proposition.








≥ 0, with c∗t representing optimal consumption in period t.
As a result, the Borrower always weakly prefers a more patient Student, i.e. a higher




Proof. When the constraint from Equation (4.1) binds, the consumption decision
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= 0. At interior solutions, however, the following Euler equation holds:
u′(c∗2) = (1 + r)δβu
′(c∗3) (4.3)





u′′(c∗2) + (1 + r)u
′′(c∗3)
< 0 (4.4)







(1 + r) > 0 (4.5)
When Equation (4.1) does not bind, therefore, more patient Students consume
less during school and more after graduation.
The second part of the proposition follows from this result. Letting U(·) denote
lifetime utility, and taking the derivative of the Borrower’s lifetime utility function
























Recall that c∗2 and c
∗
3 conform to Equation (4.3) whenever
dc∗2
dβ
6= 0. Thus this can
be simplified to
= −(1− β)δ(1 + r)u′(c∗3))
dc∗2
dβ
We have already established that
dc∗2
dβ








> 0 when Equation (4.1) does not hold with equality. When the
constraint does bind, dU
dβ
= 0 holds with equality.
Before characterizing the optimal borrowing behavior, we first determine situa-
tions in which the Borrower should always accept the loan.
Proposition IV.2. Rejecting the loan can only be optimal if doing so causes c2 ≤ I2
to hold with equality.
Proof. If Equation (4.1) does not hold with equality, then c∗2 and c
∗
3 follow Equation
(4.3). The only effect of taking the loan in this case is that doing so increases lifetime




= (1 + r)δβu′′(c∗3)
dc∗3
dI







must be of the same sign. Because
they also must sum to one (by Walras’ Law), we know that each is positive. There-
fore, consumption (and the utility level associated with consumption) increases in
both periods when the Student is given access to the loan, and the Borrower will
choose to accept the loan.
Proposition IV.3. If u(I2 + S̄) + δu(I3 − S̄) > u(I2) + δu(I3), the Borrower will
not reject the loan despite self-control problems.
Proof. Proposition IV.2 implies that turning down a loan optimally for self-control
reasons gives the Borrower utility of u(I2)+δu(I3). Turning down the loan is therefore
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optimal only when the consumption choices made by the Student will result in a lower
utility. It is trivial to show that when β = 0, the Student will choose to consume
all available income. When the Borrower accepts the loan, therefore, a Student
with β = 0 will consume (I2 + S̄, I3 − S̄). Proposition IV.1 demonstrates that the
Borrower (weakly) prefers the consumption choices of a Student with higher levels of
β. Therefore, if u(I2 + S̄) + δu(I3 − S̄) > u(I2) + δu(I3) the Borrower should accept
the loan for any level of β.
The Borrower rejects the loan in order to limit the Student’s consumption to I2.
If accepting the loan would not increase in-school consumption beyond I2, she should
accept the loan and take advantage of the government interest payment. Similarly,
if the Borrower prefers shifting S̄ in consumption from the post-graduation period
to the in-school period over consuming out of current income in both periods, she
should always accept the loan. This could occur, for example, if I3 were significantly
higher than I2.
30
We can now characterize the decision rule that determines whether the Borrower
accepts or rejects the loan.
Proposition IV.4. If u(I2 + S̄) + δu(I3− S̄) < u(I2) + δu(I3), there exists a unique
β∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that u(c∗2(β∗)) + δu(c∗3(β∗)) = u(I2) + δu(I3). The Borrower rejects
the loan optimally iff β < β∗.
Proof. We prove this proposition in three parts, beginning with the first claim.
1. At β = 0, the Student will consume I2 + S̄ and leave I3 − S̄ for the second pe-
riod. By assumption, this yields a lower utility than consuming (I2, I3). When
β = 1, there is no disagreement between the Student and the Borrower, and
30There are two factors that, in practice, attenuate the gap between I2 and I3. First, parental financial support
after college is often significantly lower than while in school. Additionally, student loans must be repaid during the
early years of a student’s earnings trajectory.
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the additional income of rS̄ ensures that the Borrower prefers (c∗2, c
∗
3) to (I2, I3).
Combining these results with the (weak) monotonicity results of Proposition
IV.1, we can draw Figure 4.4. This graph establishes the existence and unique-
ness of β∗.
2. We next address the claim that if β > β∗, the Borrower should accept the loan.
This result follows directly from Proposition IV.2. Any optimal rejection leads
to the consumption pair (I2, I3), which is, by the definition of β
∗, inferior to the
bundle selected by the Student given access to the loan when β > β∗.
3. Next we prove that β < β∗ is a sufficient condition for rejection to be optimal.
To do so, we prove that if the Borrower rejects the loan the Student will consume
(I2, I3). Because, by the definition of β





the optimal choice is to reject the loan.
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose this claim is false, i.e. that c∗2 < I2,




3). This preference implies that
the Borrower would like to consume more in the first period than would the
Student. Recall that for the Borrower, β = 1 and we have assumed that the
Student’s β < β∗ ≤ 1. A preference for more consumption in the first period





When the Student is sufficiently impatient, the Borrower will reject the subsidized
loan. Figure 4.4 demonstrates this cutoff rule and how β∗ is determined. The solid
line shows the utility the Borrower receives if she accepts the loan and allows the
Student to allocate consumption according to her preferences. The dotted line shows
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the utility the Borrower receives if she rejects the loan and constrains the Student
to consume out of current income.
CHAPTER V
Conclusion
The first two essays provide complementary evidence that low-skilled immigrants
are sophisticated economic actors, differentially selecting destinations that provide
superior labor market prospects. Unlike any previous study addressing this topic,
each of these essays relies on identifiable, policy-driven changes in labor market
conditions, allowing for estimation that relies on much less restrictive assumptions.
These results show the important role immigrants play in spreading out local shocks
across the national economy, an important implication for the local labor markets
literature. In addition, these results provide support for a major criticism of attempts
to determine how immigrants affect the wage structure by comparing cities that
receive large immigrant inflows with cities receiving smaller inflows. Finally, the
third essay provides some of the first evidence that consumers act in ways to limit
their own future choices in an empirical setting not generated by the researcher.
This finding bolsters the theoretical work being done in behavioral economics and
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